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1I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, in the post 9/11 environment, biomedical research universities have the 
unique and timely opportunity to contribute to the national defense and the “global war 
on terrorism”.  At the same time because of the very nature of the work conducted, many 
biomedical research laboratories are effectively warehouses for biological source material 
which can be used as primary ingredients in biological weapons.   As a societal 
institution, the research university’s fundamental quandary is that of striking an 
acceptable balance between a progressive biomedical research agenda and the continuing 
verifiable compliance with recent federal biosecurity requirements.   
A focused biosecurity effort is important for both private and public biomedical 
research universities, but it is also important for private biotechnology concerns and 
governmental research laboratories.  The risk inherent from a single unauthorized release 
of a biological select agent or toxin could be serious and, some would argue, frightening.1 
However, the physical security necessary to protect these select agents and toxins within 
the laboratory should not inhibit a biomedical research university’s fundamental mission, 
that of research and scientific discovery.  Implementation of progressive security 
practices coupled with a heightened vigilance at biomedical research university 
laboratories may substantially contribute to the prevention of the theft and the diversion 
of select agents and toxins and thus reduce the likelihood of a biological weapons attack 
from occurring within the United States.   
American biologists and biomedical researchers have attained a professional 
fluency with modern biosafety practices.  The standard reference for laboratory biosafety 
practices is the federal publication Biosafety in Biomedical and Microbiological 
Laboratories (BMBL)2.  That written reference document establishes a comprehensive 
series of safety standards that govern the safety practices within biomedical research 
                                                 
1 A recent Hart-Teeter Research Study, based on a national survey sample of 1,600 citizens and 250 
frontline emergency response personnel, reported that 77 percent of respondents believe the United States 
will be the target for another major terrorist attack in the next few months.  The poll further indicated that 
48 percent of all respondents selected bioterrorism as the most feared of all types of attacks, “Nation a Mix 
of Emotions on Homeland Security”  PA Times. Vol. 27. No. 4.  April 2004. 
2 The BMBL Handbook is updated every five years; the fifth edition revision is underway and will 
include substantive discussion and guidance on biosecurity.  The Federal Register.  March 23, 2004. Vol 
69, No.56 , pp. 13527-13529.   
2laboratories.  These standards of practice were adopted as safety measure for researchers 
and their staffs due to the deadly infection rates biomedical researchers had encountered 
for decades.  The strict adherence to these safety practices “. . . does contribute to a 
healthier and safer work environment for laboratorians, their co-workers, and the 
surrounding community. They must be customized for each individual laboratory and can 
be used in conjunction with other available scientific information.” 3 Biological Safety 
Officers4, who are frequently found within the universities’ Environmental Health and 
Safety Departments, educate staff as to the specifics of BMBL biosafety standards.  They 
also critically assess and carefully inspect the affected laboratories to achieve ongoing 
compliance with those standards.   
In contrast to the now near universal acceptance of these biosafety practices 
within the biomedical research community, biosecurity is a relatively new and a generally 
suspect concept.  Biosecurity can be defined as the art and science of applying modern 
physical security principles to specified research endeavors and facilities.  Its purpose is 
to ensure the positive control of certain substances of interest in order to reduce 
unauthorized access or use of those substances.5  As distinct from biosafety, biosecurity 
has a limited number of advocates and is often found to be an active and unnecessary 
impediment to the open and vigorous research practices that spark the necessary 
innovation and progress in the biological sciences. 6 
The general public’s interest in and awareness of biological weapons has surged 
during the last decade. The ease of access to the elements necessary for biological 
                                                 
3 National Institutes for Health. (1999). “Laboratory Security and Emergency response for 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, BMBL Appendix F”.  Accessed on 18 April 2004 at 
http://bmbl.od.nih.gov/appendf.htm. 
4 Biological Safety Officers are safety professionals who are trained and educated on the unique 
demands and dangers encountered in research involving biological substances in laboratory and 
manufacturing settings. 
5 The CDC at the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 4th Edition, Appendix F defines 
biosecurity as “Preventing unauthorized entry into laboratory areas and preventing unauthorized removal of dangerous 
biological agents from the laboratory”. A similar but distinct definition is offered by R. Salerno and J. Koelm in 
“Biological Laboratory and Transportation Security and the Biological Weapons Convention” SAND No. 2002-1067B. 
“ the objective of biosecurity is to protect facilities against the theft or diversion of high-consequence microbial agents, 
which could be used by someone who maliciously intends to conduct bioterrorism or pursue biological weapons 
proliferation”. 
6 T. Agres (2003) “Researchers Bemoan Bioterror Bureaucracy”  The Scientist., September 23, 2003.  Accessed 
on 21 April 2004.  http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20030924/02/. 
3weapon production in a civilian setting is alarming.  Biological agents and toxins can be 
acquired by a variety of means that range from theft to self-manufacture. The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security notes that “the expertise, technology and material needed 
to build the most deadly weapons known to mankind – including chemical, biological, 
and radiological and nuclear weapons – are spreading inexorably.” 7 
Certain biological materials are integral to the manufacture of biological weapons 
of mass destruction.  Such biological weapons are potentially the most dangerous within 
a terrorist’s arsenal.  A biological weapon, unlike a chemical or nuclear weapon, strikes 
silently and has a delayed presentation. Days or weeks may elapse between exposure and 
the actual presentation of disease.  Yet these same biological select agents are necessary 
for progressive biomedical research.  For example, to effectively research the attributes of 
cutaneous anthrax disease, a biomedical researcher must have ready access to a stock of 
anthrax bacterial spores, Bacillus anthracis.  
More than 11,000 universities and private organizations engage in biomedical 
research within the United States, and of these more than 230 universities routinely use 
one or more select agents and toxins8 in research. Universities are the primary recipients 
of federal biomedical research funding; the National Institutes of Health awarded more 
than $22 billion in grants to universities in 2002. Yet research universities were not 
designed with security as a goal, and they remain easy to obtain  access to, easy to 
infiltrate, readily visible to the news media, and as organizations go among the least able 
to defend themselves.9   
Media focus on biological weapons has also increased during the last twenty 
years.  During that time a less than successful attempt at introducing salmonella in 
Oregon occurred in 1984.  A series of nation wide best-sellers published in the mid-1990s 
focused on exotic biological attacks.  Finally the anthrax attacks of the autumn of 2001  
                                                 
7 G.W. Bush (2002) National Strategy for Homeland Security.  Accessed on 21 April 2004 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/. 
8 Select Agents and Toxins are specified substances established by federal regulation by the 
Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture pursuant to their statutory authority, see Chapter 
II, Appendix 1 and  http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/salist.pdf . 
9 Attorney General of the United States. (1993). Report to Congress on the Extent and Effects of 
Domestic and International Terrorism on Animal Enterprises. September 2, 1993 - Report Transmitted to 
the Vice President and the Speaker of the House.  Accessed on 12 December 2004 at 
http://www.responsiblewildlifemanagement.org/congress_on_animal_rights_terrorism.htm. 
4profoundly changed the public’s perception of security measures at the nation’s 
biomedical research laboratories. 10 The anthrax attacks were geographically dispersed. 
These unsolved criminal attacks occurred at locations as diverse as Connecticut and 
Florida and required the evacuation of the offices of the United States Senate as well as  
regional postal processing centers.  They also highlighted the weaknesses of several of 
our public health and biosecurity systems, and in 2002 the United States Congress 
adopted statutory law to address many of those systemic weaknesses.  This thesis 
discusses the implementation of biosecurity practices required by the 2002 statutue. 
State of the art laboratory facilities staffed with skilled scientists are found 
throughout the United States at research universities.  The modern research university, be 
it public or private, is an intellectual resource for the people of the United States and to  
the world at large.  The research university is cosmopolitan by nature.  Graduate students 
and post-doctoral fellows from across the globe routinely relocate to the United States to 
engage in biomedical research.  The large numbers of international scientists employed or 
associated with these laboratories presents very unique challenges.  Yet biomedical 
research acts as the dynamo from which change and progress in the life sciences are 
realized.   
The research conducted in the university setting can be divided into two general 
categories – basic and applied.  Basic research grapples with fundamental intellectual 
questions which may have no direct link to practical application, while applied research 
focuses on the practical application of research on a problem of significance.  Biomedical 
research at the research university includes both.  The importance of such research was 
assessed by Broad and Glanz (2003) 
Clearly science has mattered a lot, for a long time.  Advances in food, 
public health and medicine helped raise life expectancy in the United 
States in the past century from roughly 50 to 80 years.  So too, world 
population between 1950 and 1990 more than doubled, now exceeding six 
billion.  Biology discovered the structure of DNA, made test-tube babies 
and cured diseases.  And the decoding of the human genome is leading 
                                                 
10 Those books included Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone (1996) and Cobra Event (1998). The anthrax 
attack is now referred to as 5/11 as five of the eleven individuals exposed to anthrax died from that 
exposure in the autumn of 2001. 
5scientists toward a detailed understanding of how the body works, offering 
the hope of new treatments for cancer and other diseases.11 
During the last decade, public awareness of the janus-faced nature of biological 
research has increased with the understanding that the same research that has led to 
vaccines and pharmaceuticals which have enabled mankind to conquer diseases and 
counter weaponized biological agents can also be used to develop and refine the lethal 
biological weapons themselves.12  Biotechnology’s dual use was considered in depth by a 
National Academy of Sciences Panel (NAS) in January 2003.  While university based 
biomedical research has customarily been conducted without security restraints, in the 
current geopolitical climate that past practice is subject to serious debate and active 
reconsideration.13  To address the concerns that research may be misused by non-state 
actors or others, the NAS has recommended a solution, specifically that a system 
composed of both locally based review committees and a single national committee – the 
National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense – to include both security experts and 
recognized biologists be formed, activated, and tasked to assess biomedical research and 
devise ways to keep these materials safe14. 
The university-based academic community wrestles with finding an acceptable 
balance between intellectual freedom for their faculty and graduate students and the 
university’s civic responsibilities to the society at large.  Difficult choices concerning 
traditional academic freedom are being made in an age of heightened concern about 
                                                 
11 W. Broad and J. Glanz. (2003). “Does Science Matter”.  The New York Times. November 11, 
2003. 
12 L. Ember (2002).“Biotechnology: A Two Edged Sword”. Chemical & Engineering News., June 17, 
2002. 
13 S. Block (2001). “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons”. The American Scientist. Vol. 89, 
Number 1. Block a prominent Stanford biologist, became very engaged in this topic early in the discussions 
of the national security impact of biological weapons.  
14 The suggested board has been formed, yet not staffed as of December 2004. The board, the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), is to provide technical oversight on a variety of 
biosecurity issues.  At the FAQ website, the Board notes, “The NSABB will advise all federal departments 
and agencies that conduct or support life science research.  The new board will recommend specific 
strategies for the efficient and effective oversight of dual use biological research, including the 
development of guidelines for the case-by-case review and approval by Institutional Biosafety Committees 
(IBCs).  The NSABB will take into consideration both national security concerns and the needs of the 
research community.  This includes strategies for fostering continued rapid progress in public health 
research (e.g., new diagnostics, treatments, vaccines and other prophylactic measures, and detection 
methods), as well as in food and agriculture research while being mindful of national security concerns.”  
Accessed on 26 December 2004 at http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/faq.htm . 
6terrorism.  Widespread and deeply entrenched resistance is still encountered at the 
university to any limitation on perceived intellectual freedom.  The federal government, a 
major source of funding for much of biomedical research15, has defined the primary 
principle of research as:   
1. Ensure Academic Freedom and Publication 
Academic research freedom based upon collaboration, and the scrutiny of 
research findings within the scientific community, are at the heart of the 
scientific enterprise. Institutions that receive NIH research funding 
through grants or contracts ("Recipients") have an obligation to preserve 
research freedom and ensure timely disclosure of their scientists' research 
findings through, for example, publications and presentations at  scientific 
meetings. Recipients are expected to avoid signing agreements that unduly 
limit the freedom of investigators to collaborate and publish. 16 
The very nature of modern scholarship in the life sciences may unintentionally aid  
terrorists in targeting a specific scholar or university.  Scholars, as a matter of practice, 
publish their work in peer-reviewed professional journals and present those research 
findings at symposia and conferences throughout the world.  In pursuit of quality science, 
scholars try to conduct and publish transparent research thereby enabling colleagues to 
confirm their findings through the exacting replication of the scientific experiments.  A 
scholar’s ongoing work and research interests are well known within their academic 
discipline, and publication practices continue to include listing the specific addresses and 
affiliations of the scholars involved.  Visitors, scholars and other interested persons are 
commonplace on campus and cause neither alarm nor concern within that unique 
community.   
The risk of unintentionally aiding terrorists was directly considered in the January 
2003 National Academy of Sciences conference by both senior academic scientists and 
government security specialists. “While some scientists contend that the best defense 
against biological weapons is robust research that is widely accessible, security 
                                                 
15 SHARING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH RESOURCES:  Principles and Guidelines for Recipients 
of NIH Research Grants and Contracts.  Federal Register Notice. Tuesday, May 25, 1999. 64 FR 28205.  
Accessed on 18 April 2004 at   http://ott.od.nih.gov/NewPages/RTguide.htm.   
16 "Developing Sponsored Research Agreements: Considerations for Recipients of NIH Research 
Grants and Contracts". Federal Register. Vol.59, No.215, Tuesday, November 8, 1994. p.55676. 
7specialists maintain that scientists are being naïve at best and reckless at worst.”17  The 
initiation or continuation of research involving biological select agents and previously 
accepted practices within academia poses a risk to the scholar, the university and the 
community as a whole.    
The nation must balance this historic, and many would say essential, academic  
freedom of inquiry with the people’s reasonable expectation of responsible scientific 
conduct and the acknowledgement of national security concerns by biomedical research 
scientists.  The task of balancing academic rights and civic responsibilities is not a new 
problem.  During the last sixty years much nuclear physics research has been 
significantly regulated by a similar national review body, ensuring both the freedom of 
academic inquiry and the security of the nation’s defense by regulating the publication 
and open discussion of certain research within the nation’s universities.18 
Universities by tradition and practice are decentralized and somewhat loosely knit 
organizations.  Generally members of the biomedical research faculty consider 
themselves less as employees of a large organization and more as skilled partners within 
a group of scientists committed to research excellence.  Command and control practices 
which may succeed in many large organizations, such as manufacturing and the military, 
may not be as effective in the context of a university, especially a renowned research 
university with tenured faculty members.  World class research scientists are sought after 
by other organizations and are generally a mobile group of professionals who often have 
few or no qualms about changing their affiliation to another major research university, 
even one located outside the United States, if it would further their individual research 
agendas and eliminate obstacles to their research.19 
The creation of a list of select agents and toxins developed within the United 
States during the last six years has been perceived as an obstacle to biomedical research 
by some prominent scientists. The designation of such select agents provoked some 
                                                 
17 D. Schemo. (2003). “Threats and Responses: Bioterrorism”.  The New York Times. January 10, 
2003. 
18 National Academy of Sciences (1982) Scientific Communication and National Security..  Accessed 
on 12 June 2004 at http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309033322/html/. 
19 This generalization is supported by the author’s twenty four years of professional experience at a 
major biomedical research university. 
8controversy within the biomedical research community.  The federal government at the 
42 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 73, defines a select agent as: 
. . . any microorganism (including, but not limited to, bacteria, viruses, 
fungi, rickettsiae, or protozoa), or infectious substance, or any naturally 
occurring, bioengineered, or synthesized component of any such 
microorganism or infectious substance, capable of causing death, disease, 
or other biological malfunction in a human, an animal, plant, or another 
living organism,: deterioration of food, water, equipment supplies or 
material of any kind; or deleterious alteration of the environment.    
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) designated forty-three 
substances as select agents or toxins at 42 CFR 73.  These substances are listed in 
Appendix A. This list was finalized after significant controversy within the scientific 
community, including among them biomedical researchers, microbiologists, biological 
weapons experts, and public health officials.  The current list of select agents is based 
upon work initially done at the Centers for Disease Control in partnership with subject-
matter experts in 1996 to  1997, to fulfill the statutory requirements of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Public Law 104-132, Section 511.  
Under the provisions of that law the Department of Health and Human Services was to 
prepare a list of select agents that are capable of causing substantial harm to human 
health.  That task was fraught with disagreement and controversy.  Hundreds of 
candidates were reviewed and culled to make a list that became the basis for the 2002 
Select Agent List.20   
 While there has been some focus on issues of biosafety for several decades,  
biosecurity is a new concept and one which was of generally little interest to university 
administrators and researchers prior to 2002.  Auditors from the General Accounting 
Office noted in their November 2002 report that the “CDC can improve its management 
of the Select Agent Program . . . to reasonably ensure that appropriate security and safety 
precautions are in place for select agents.”21  While the Inspector General of the  
                                                 20 M. Enserink and D. Malakoff. (2001). “Congress Weighs Select Agent Update.” Science. 
November 16, 2001, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003). “Select Agent Program”.  
Accessed on 30 April 2004 at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap. 
21 General Accounting Office (2002) Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent 
Program, GAO-03-315R.  Accessed on 12 June 2004 at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03315r.pdf. 
9Department of Agriculture noted in a September 2003 report that “. . . there were 
no consolidated standards either federal or institutional that provided guidance on 
security to the laboratories.”22 
The research question explored in this work is how can specific public biomedical 
research universities securely use and store biological select agents.  The answer(s) 
proposed to this question will be of value to university presidents, facility officers, law 
enforcement executives, and research directors.  This research may also translate both to 
use in private industry as well as other organizations engaged in biotechnology research 
involving select biological agents and toxins.   
While most university environmental health and safety functional staff are 
prepared by technical training and professional education to ensure the ongoing 
compliance with modern biosafety practices within the laboratory, there remains a 
general ignorance within many research universities as to fundamental biosecurity 
practices.  Such practices are critical to the positive control of biological select agents and 
toxins in laboratory settings. Enhancement of security at biomedical research laboratories 
using biological select agents and toxins is the civically responsible thing to do.   
This thesis includes a policy analysis with a primary focus on the implementation 
of the specific federal regulations governing biosecurity for select agents and toxins.  The 
analysis will center on two specific settings during the period 2001 to 2003, one an 
academic health science center and the other a state supported comprehensive cancer 
center.  The goal is to assess compliance efforts and to explore the specific 
implementation challenges encountered during an abbreviated compliance time frame. 
The three criteria used in that analysis are efficiency (essentially costs - labor and capital 
equipment/sunk costs), effectiveness (the ability to demonstrate acceptable compliance to 
federal regulators within an established time frame) and equity (willing compliance with 
statutory and regulatory mandates, as well as the demonstrable impact the compliance 
choices have had on institutional/research agendas).  
                                                 
22 Office of the Inspector General, Southeast Region, US Department of Agriculture, Audit Report: 
Controls Over Biological, Chemical and Radioactive Materials at Institutions Funded by the United States 
Department of Agriculture, 50099-14-AT September 2003.  Accessed on 15 May 2004 at 
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50099-14-At.pdf. 
10
The documented biosecurity compliance efforts will be supplemented by a meta-
textual review to establish context, including the spectrum of public media and 
professional journals, and a series of interviews with affected primary investigators, 
institutional safety officers and the program officers at the Centers for Disease Control, 
Department of Health and Human Services.  
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II will discuss the select agent 
list-making process within the United States.  The specific substances included on the 
list, as well as subsequent prioritization of the approved list is discussed.  The future 
viability of the list of select agents and toxins is explored, with significant current and 
potential problems highlighted.  In Chapter III the current statutory laws and applicable 
federal regulations are discussed as they pertain to the biosecurity for select agents and 
toxins.  The performance of the responsible regulatory agency, Centers for Disease 
Control, in this specialized area is assessed as well as the tension created within the 
organization as a result of this statutorily assigned regulatory role. The controversy 
caused by the adoption and implementation of these new regulations on an institutional 
and national level is also be covered. In Chapter IV the experiences of two biomedical 
research universities in establishing compliance to the federally-mandated biosecurity 
regulations is explored.  Through a series of principal actor interviews and archived 
document reviews, the challenges encountered and the compliance achieved with the 
federal biosecurity regulations is discussed and institutional conformance with those 
regulations assessed. Chapter V presents the significant findings relevant to the research 
question.   A credible answer to the basic research question, effective security for select 
biological agents and toxins, is proposed.  Effective biosecurity is found to be the result 
of a coordinated, multi-disciplinary and collegial effort by three professional groups 
(primary investigators, environmental health and safety specialists and law enforcement). 
The thesis closes with a discussion of the future opportunities for research in this 
important, but often neglected area of homeland security. 
11
II. LIST MAKING 
We will undertake a concerted effort to prevent the spread and use of 
biological weapons and to protect our people in the event these terrible 
weapons are ever unleashed by a rogue state, a terrorist group, or an 
international criminal organization. 
    President William Jefferson Clinton23 
 
On September the 11th, the world learned how evil men can use airplanes 
as weapons of terror. Shortly thereafter, we learned how evil people can 
use microscopic spores as weapons of terror. Bioterrorism is a real threat 
to our country. It's a threat to every nation that loves freedom. Terrorist 
groups seek biological weapons; we know some rogue states already have 
them.  
      President George W. Bush24 
 
This chapter considers one of the most important issues underlying the topic of 
biosecurity for select biological agents and toxins, the scope of the issue as defined by the 
list promulgated by the federal government.  That list of the substances defined as select 
agents and toxins, establishes the parameters of all subsequent legal and administrative 
requirements.   The practice of list making is reviewed, some of the notable responses to 
the list-making in this specific context are considered, and the relevancy of the sub 
categorization of risk within the list is assessed.  To assist the reader, Appendix A:   
Acronyms is provided as a ready reference for the several common and somewhat arcane 
acronyms used throughout this thesis. 
Psychologists have found list making to be an activity of some interest, but not 
within the specific context in which that task is examined in this paper.25  List making in 
                                                 
23 Remarks of the President at the United States Naval Academy Commencement. May 22, 1998.  
Accessed on 20 August 2004 at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/naval.htm. 
24 Remarks of the President of the United States at Signing of H.R. 3448, the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002. The Rose Garden. June 12, 2002. Accessed on 14 September 2004 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020612-1.html . 
12
this context is actually the artifact produced from the human interaction of various 
individuals and members of small groups who endeavor to meet a specific policy 
objective.  Within  the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)26, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to promulgate a list and necessary 
regulations for select biological agents.  It is of particular interest that within the AEDPA 
the Secretary was provided with very specific guidance as to the criteria to be used in 
making this list  as follows:  
 
(d) REGULATORY CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS- 
(1) LIST OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS- 
 
(A) IN GENERAL- The Secretary shall, through 
regulations promulgated under subsection (f), establish and 
maintain a list of each biological agent that has the 
potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety. 
( 
B) CRITERIA- In determining whether to include an agent 
on the list under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall-- 
 
(i) consider-- 
(I) the effect on human health of exposure to 
the agent; 
(II) the degree of contagiousness of the 
agent and the methods by which the agent is 
transferred to humans; 
(III) the availability and effectiveness of    
immunizations to prevent and treatments for 
any illness resulting from infection by the 
agent; and 
(IV) any other criteria that the Secretary 
considers appropriate;  
 
and 
                                                 
25The psychological literature is replete with references to the practice of list making as both a disease 
symptom (Obsessive Compulsive Disorder) and also a therapeutic technique in effectively countering the 
effects of chronic depression and anxiety.  For example:  S. Lepore & J. Smyth. (2002). The writing cure: 
How expressive writing promotes health and well-being. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological 
Association and M. Jenike (1994). “Managing the patient with treatment –resistant obsessive compulsive 
disorder”.  Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 55:3 (suppl):11-17, 1994. 
26 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.  Accessed on 15 September 2004 at 
http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=CB20011221147 
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(ii) consult with scientific experts 
representing appropriate professional  
groups. 27  
The AEDPA was enacted on April 24, 1996, and the Secretary was directed to 
promulgate proposed rules within 60 days and final rules within 120 days of the 
enactment of the legislation.  Thus, the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services 
had both a regulatory task and specific guidelines as to list criteria and parties to be 
included in the production of that list.  
This legislation was in large part a response to the episodes of shipment of 
biological agents to unauthorized individuals who had links to criminal activities and 
domestic terrorist organizations in 1995.28  This situation was a near classic application 
of small group dynamics in a specific task oriented environment.29  When examining list 
making in this context, we have a variety of factors to consider including power (formal, 
informal and expert), time constraints30 and formal and informal communication patterns.  
Absent detailed interviews of principals and a critical review of the group’s working 
papers (documentary evidence), the actual group dynamics in play can only be inferred;  
but these inferences can be generally accurate if compared carefully to the official 
records and the open source media on the topic.  Some of those inferences on list making 
during 1996-1997 include that the representatives of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (specifically the Centers for Disease Control – CDC) were in the 
position of greatest influence. These civil servants, many possessing formal training as 
biologists, microbiologists or biomedical researchers, had formal power anchored in both 
statutory law and federal regulations.   The CDC representatives did exercise control over 
the agenda, for they convened the meetings and established the participant list.   
                                                 
27 Guidance is found at Public Law 104-132, Title V, Subtitle B, Biological Weapons Restrictions, 
Section 511 Enhanced penalties and control of biological agents. 
28 S. Leader (1997)  “The Rise of Terrorism”  Security Management.   Accessed on 17 September 
2004 at http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/000339.html. 
29 Small group dynamics is an area rich in research, primarily applied research, published in either 
industrial psychology or administrative sciences journals.  A seminal recent work in the field is R. Tindale, 
et. al. (1998) Theory and Research on Small Groups.  New York: Plenum Press. 
30 Some critically incisive work was recently completed on the effect of time urgency on actual 
performance E. J. Kempf. (2003). “Time’s Up:  The Effects of Time Urgency on Dyadic Performance”.  
Missouri Western University Clearinghouse.  Accessed on 16 September 2004 at 
http://clearinghouse.mwsc.edu/manuscripts/436.asp. 
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Such regulatory work does not take place in a vacuum, and orderly compliance to 
externally imposed regulations could neither be expected nor realized.  The process was 
rife with negotiations with the other groups that had identifiable stakeholder interests.  A 
primary stakeholder in this issue was the microbiologists.  The American Society of 
Microbiology (ASM), representing the professional interests of the nation’s  
microbiologists, played a critical role in the development of the federal regulations.31   
The society reported that in drafting the regulations that took effect on April 15, 1997, 
they had surveyed the 11,000 members of the society by e-mail soliciting their advice as 
to the organisms that should be subject to regulation and the protocols pertaining to their 
safe transfer and shipment.  While the opinions provided by the ASM members polled 
were far from unanimous, when integrated with the goal of reducing the threat of 
terrorism by focusing on those substances that have the greatest potential for use in 
biological weapons an acceptable list was crafted.  The ASM noted in their 1997 report 
that: 
As with other issues related to the potential misuse of microorganisms as 
biological weapons, the ASM offered advice in the development of these 
regulations that was consistent with ensuring continuance of essential 
biomedical research and diagnostic activities. In the final regulations, the 
list of restricted agents is limited so as not to unduly restrict legitimate 
biomedical research. Clinical laboratories certified under the Clinical 
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) that intend to use 
and transfer select agents only for diagnostic, reference, verification, or 
proficiency testing purposes are exempt from the requirements of the 
regulations. Thus, essential medical diagnostic practices can proceed 
unimpaired. 32 
The list of select biological agents and toxins circa 1997 was finalized after 
significant controversy within the scientific community, including biomedical 
researchers, microbiologists, biological weapons experts and public health officials.  The 
difficulty of list making was exacerbated by the vested self-interests of several 
individuals and organizations in keeping substances outside the scope of the list, to avoid 
the significant restrictions on research incurred when a substance is labeled as a select 
                                                 
31 R. Atlas (1997) Preventing the Misuse of Microorganisms: The Role of the ASM in Protecting 
Against Biological Weapons.  Accessed on 17 September 2004 at 
http://www.asm.org/Policy/index.asp?bid=3009. 
32 Ibid, p. 3. 
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agent.  Additionally, primary investigators, who have a comprehensive knowledge of the 
attributes and risk potential for each of the several select biological agents and toxins,  
could reach consensus on some, but not unanimity on all, substances and organisms that 
are included on the list.  
In the autumn of 2001 anthrax spores were mailed throughout the United States.  
Attacks occurred at the Unites States Senate, United States Postal Service mail sorting 
facilities and media corporate headquarters.  Anthrax spores were also mailed to an 
elderly woman in rural Connecticut.  Taken together these incidents increased the 
national awareness of the threat of bioterrorism and the acknowledgment of the nation’s 
vulnerability to such an attack.  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (BPARA), Public Law 107-188 was adopted as 
law on June 12, 2002, as a legislative response to the surge of anthrax attacks within the 
United States.  The statute has three overarching goals: 
• assessing and improving infrastructure integrity; 
• increasing pathogen security; 
• and augmenting public health capabilities. 
This statute changed the scope of the Secretary of Health and Human Services list 
making responsibilities as previously outlined in the AEDPA.  The BPARA mandated the 
review and biennial publication of the list of select agents and toxins or more often as 
needed.  The criteria used to create the Select Agent List and the subsequent federal 
regulations are critical to the question examined in this thesis, specifically the physical 
security practices at biomedical research facilities using select agents.  The substances 
that are included or excluded from the biennial list will drive the actions required of the 
institutions and facilities that use, possess, transmit and store the materials.   
That list making exercise in 2002 was fraught with disagreement and 
controversy33  Professional groups and academic scientists expressed critical concerns on 
                                                 
33 The controversy raged not only in professional journals and publications, but also in the major 
media outlets in 2002; see S. Davis. (2002). “Government tightens controls on lab agents”. DVM. October; 
J. Fierer and T. Kirkland. (2002). “Questioning the CDC’s ‘select agent’ criteria”. Science. January 4, 
2002; D. Schemo (2002).  “Threats and Responses: Laboratories”.  The New York Times.  December 17, 
2002 and R. Mestel (2002). “In the Lab: Suspicion Spreads”.  The Los Angeles Times. August 28, 2002 
and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003).  “Public Comments on New Regulation”  03-SAR-
013.  Accessed on 15 December 2003 at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/comments/03sar013.htm. 
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several topics.  First, there was significant disagreement about the inclusion of some 
agents and toxins on the Select Agent List, much of it carried over from the 1997 
discussions. “Although such legislation is probably appropriate, the CDC’s ‘watch list’ 
contains many organisms, such as fungus Coccifioides immitis, that are unlikely 
candidates for biological weapons”34.   Second, many scientists accused university 
administrators of overreaction to the anthrax events of the autumn of 2001 and the 
subsequent gross misapplication of the provisions of the BPARA in 2002, “Biologists 
understand that times, and laws, have changed. . .the response by university 
administrators and authorities – who are not, after all, microbiologists – have been driven 
by an inflated fear of the bacterium itself.  The reaction…has been far out of proportion 
to the actual risk…”35 The cost of compliance with the new law and regulations was 
deemed quite significant. “After 11 September; however, convenience and efficiency 
gave way to security . . . Across the country, in hundreds of ways both large and small, 
US academic researchers are feeling the effects of that catastrophic day on their ability to 
carry out science . . . eager to plug security gaps. Congress and agency officials have set 
tight deadlines for complying with the new regulations…the incentive to get it right is 
very high because universities and researchers who don’t comply face stiff, potentially 
criminal penalties” 36   
Unlike the 1997 version of the list, the 2002 version would require certain 
facilities and primary investigators to significantly change both laboratory practices and 
area security measures to achieve compliance with the new regulations.  During this 
iteration of the list making exercise, the CDC again included such major stakeholders as  
the ASM and several universities in the crafting of the list.  A federal interagency work 
group was formed to finalize the list.37 That interagency work group included 
representatives from 21 separate federal agencies.  They reviewed hundreds of candidates 
                                                 
34 J. Fierer and T. Kirkland. (2002). “ Questioning the CDC’s ‘select agent’ criteria”. Science. January 
4, 2002 
35 R. Mestel (2002). “In the Lab: Suspicion Spreads”.  The Los Angeles Times. August 28, 2002. 
36 D. Malakoff (2003). “Tighter security reshapes research”. Science.  September 6, 2003. 
37 Department of Health and Human Services (2002)  Public Meeting on the Interim Final Rule for 
Select Agents, December 16, 2002.  Accessed on 17 September 2004 at 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/cdc-05at.txt.  
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for the notional list. That notional list was culled to form the 2002 Select Biological 
Agent and Toxins list, see Appendix 2.   
The list is unique because it includes both select biological agents and toxins 
applicable to man and animals.  The CDC, whose primary jurisdiction includes the agents 
with impact on humans, reported that 21 agents were their sole regulatory responsibility 
and 20 substances were to be found on an overlap list.  That overlap list was jointly 
regulated by the Department of Health and Human Services (CDC) and the Department 
of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).  The two 
departments worked closely to ensure that their regulations in this area worked in tandem.  
A unique aspect of the 2002 version of the Select Agent List, which will be an ongoing 
factor in all subsequent lists, is the inclusion of materials that contain genetically altered 
substances.  The life sciences continue to evolve at a rapid rate and the Select Agent List 
must be dynamic to remain relevant.  Between 1997 and 2002 great strides were made in 
recombinant DNA scientific work.  This progress prompted regulators to include such 
substances within the 2002 version of the Select Agent List.  At the December 16, 2002,  
public meeting co-hosted by the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human 
Services, Dr. Stephen Ostroff, the deputy director of the National Center for Infectious 
Diseases at CDC and the acting director of the Select Agent Program noted regarding this 
element of the list making that: 
. . . we reassessed what essentially we were trying to focus on, and that is 
the ability to create, through the genome of one of the viruses, the ability 
to replicate more of it through some sort of recombinant technique.  And 
we believe in number 1, where we've specified nucleic acids that are either 
synthetic or naturally derived, that are either contiguous or have been 
fragmented and then     reassembled, that if they encode for an infectious 
or replicative competent form of any of the select agents viruses listed is 
what we're intent on regulating here. 
Thus viral nucleic acid extracted in and of itself would not be subject to the 
requirements of the select agent rule.  Its inclusion would be dependent upon it to be put 
into a system, as noted here, where there is the potential to produce replicative forms of 
the virus.38 
                                                 
38Department of Health and Human Services (2002). page 25. 
18
The regulators and those subject to these regulations were able to agree that some 
of these substances on the list presented a substantially greater danger to the public health 
people of the United States and the world.  Those substances (viruses, bacteria and 
toxins) were accorded a higher classification in a public health matrix.  A cursory review 
of some of these biological agents may serve to illustrate the danger posed to humans by  
exposure to these agents, see Table 1. 
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available 
Source: Adapted from the chart “Characteristics and Symptoms of Some Anti-Human Biological 
Agents” at the Henry Stimson Center.  Accessed on 17 September 2004 
http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?sn=cb2001112953#human. 
The Centers for Disease Control further classifies the Select Agents into three 
categories.  These three categories enable government officials, scientists, public health 
workers and first responders to quickly assess the risk of specified select agents.  At 
Category A, high-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security 
because they: 
• can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person;  
• result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health 
impact;  
• might cause public panic and social disruption 
• require special action for public health preparedness. 
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At Category B, the second highest priority agents include those that: 
• are moderately easy to disseminate;  
• result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates 
• require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity and enhanced 
disease surveillance 
Finally at Category C, the third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that 
could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of:  
• availability;  
• ease of production and dissemination; and  
• potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health  
As shown in Table 2, the categories contain agents that range from toxins to 
viruses and many are very well known threats to public health and national security. 
 
Table 2. CDC Categorization of Select Agents   
Category A 
 
» Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) 
» Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) 
» Plague (Yersinia pestis) 
» Smallpox (variola major) 
» Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) 
» Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses [e.g., Ebola, Marburg] and 




» Brucellosis (Brucella species) 
» Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens 
» Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella species, Escherichia coli 
O157:H7, Shigella) 
» Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) 
» Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei) 
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» Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci) 
» Q fever (Coxiella burnetii) 
» Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans) 
» Staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
» Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii) 
» Viral encephalitis (alphaviruses [e.g., Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, western equine encephalitis]) 





» Emerging infectious diseases such as Nipah virus and hantavirus 
  
Source:  Centers for Disease Control  
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp. 
 
While such categorization aids in understanding and is generally defensible, a 
caveat should be made that this categorization is not comprehensive and the absence of 
an agent placement in Category A does not diminish its potential danger to the nation as a 
bio-weapon.  
The list making in both 1997 and 2002 were major achievements by the federal 
government, indicating responsiveness to the desires of the Congress and the ability to 
successfully partner with several disparate groups to craft robust and flexible regulations 
in an area that has direct and enduring impact on the national security and modern 
biomedical research. We now turn from the dynamics of the list making exercise to a 
detailed discussion of the statutory law and administrative regulations that are 
foundational to the biosecurity effort within the United States. 
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III. STATUTORY LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 
In this chapter the legal and administrative context in which regulation of 
biological agents and toxins occurs is examined in some detail. The efforts to regulate 
select biological agents and toxins within American biomedical research takes place 
within a context that has been greatly influenced by western history as well as 
international and statutory laws.  While we face continuing threats from chemical, 
radiological, incendiary, and explosive weapons of mass destruction, this thesis focuses  
on biological weapons and their precursors for these substances are available within the 
university laboratory and are the most economical of all potential weapons of mass 
destruction to construct.  The chapter opens with a short history of the use of biological 
weapons including a vignette of the physical effects of exposure to anthrax, followed by a  
review of the applicable international law, statutory law and federal regulations.   To fully 
understand the importance of select biological agents and toxins as a policy issue, it is 
crucial that the intricacies of the applicable law and federal regulations be outlined.  
  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ISSUE 
Biological weapons of war are reported to be as old as war itself.  In a recent book 
on the history of early man, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological 
and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World, the folklorist Adrienne Mayor39 makes the 
innovative argument that bacteria, viruses and toxins have been deployed on the 
battlefield stretching back to the earliest history of western man and are referenced in 
classical myths of western civilization.  However, in a generally more accepted historical 
                                                 
39 In this work Mayor traces back the earliest reference to biological warfare to a legend of poisoned 
arrows in which the Greek God Hercules had a quiver of missiles tipped with the hydra's venom (probably 
snake venom).  Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the 
Ancient World (2003). Van Wees notes in his cogent book review “Germs of Truth” American Scientist. 
May-June 2004.Accessed on 15 June 2004 at 
http://www.americanscientist.org/template/BookReviewTypeDetail/assetid/32687. that her central message 
that “a warning that biological and chemical weapons, once created, are almost impossible to contain and 
are liable to backfire against those who design and deploy them.” is unassailable, but her research methods 
are non-standard and her conclusions are often broad. 
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chronology of biological warfare in the west40, three events are notable.  First, in 1346 at 
the siege of Kaffa (now known as Feodossia, Ukraine) bodies of Tartar soldiers who 
succumbed to the plague were thrown over the city’s walls. It is hypothesized, and widely 
accepted, that this was the precipitating event for the infamous plague pandemic that 
spread over the entire continent of Europe from Genoa via the Mediterranean seaports in 
the fourteenth century.  
Second, in 1710 during a war between Russia and Sweden, Russian Imperial 
troops used the cadavers of plague victims to provoke an epidemic among their Swedish 
enemies. The third notable event occurred in North America in 1767 during the French 
and Indian War, 1754-1767.  During that colonial war both English and French field 
armies relied heavily on the support of Native American allies. The English attacked Fort  
Carillon twice and were repulsed each time with heavy losses. Sir Jeffery Amherst, an 
English general, then surreptitiously provided the Native Americans allied with the 
French forces with blankets contaminated with smallpox virus. The resulting epidemic 
decimated the Native American population. Shortly thereafter, General Amherst 
successfully attacked Fort Carillon and renamed it Fort Ticonderoga. By deduction, the 
small pox epidemic played a significant role in the victory.   
Even as late as World War One armies have attempted to utilize disease as a force 
multiplier in battle although the recorded German attempts to infect allied war horses 
with glanders during that war were deemed complete failures.  In the 1920s the civilized 
world, recoiling from the terrors and horrors experienced in the First World War, sought 
to regulate and control the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. A Geneva 
Protocol sought to regulate both chemical and biological agents in warfare.    
However, the actual efficacy of the Protocol was seriously suspect.  This protocol 
had no discernible impact on the Japanese Empire as it pursued the use of biological 
weapons against the people of China in the 1930s to 1940s.  The infamous Dr. Shiro 
Ishii, a Japanese army surgeon affiliated with Japanese Army Units 731 and 100, 
                                                 
40 Several sources agree upon these pivotal events in western biological warfare.  See “The United 
States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases’ Short History of Biowarfare.”Accessed on 
15 June 2004  http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usamriid/bw-hist.htm. and M. Wheelis (2002). “A 
Short History of Biological Warfare and Weapons” in M. Chevier et. al. (2002) The Implementation of 
Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.  Amsterdam: ISO 
Press. 
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conducted field tests of both offensive and defensive biological weapons on military and 
civilian targets from 1939-1942 in Manchuria, China.  It is estimated that “. . . more than 
10,000 people were killed or allowed to die after deliberate infection.”41  
As Table 3 shows, in the post-war period, the major powers continued biological 
weapons research as an element of their national defense. 
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 Russia   
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Source: Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer (2001). America’s Achilles’ Heel. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
These powers included the United States who fielded major research and weapons 
programs centered primarily at Fort Detrick, Maryland.  President Nixon ordered the 
cessation of such weapons programs in 1969.  However, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics did not relent in their research and weapons acquisition efforts.  The former 
Soviet Union was reported to have intentionally flaunted the provisions of relevant 
international treaties, especially during the period 1972 to 1992.  Biopreparat, the Soviet 
state pharmaceutical agency, actively engaged in significant research and production of 
weaponized biological agents.  Professor Ken Alibek, formerly known as Colonel 
Kanatjan Alibekov, has fully reported on the scope of these treaty transgressions during 
                                                 
41 M. Wheelis (2002). p. 4. 
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his intelligence debriefings, television appearances and subsequent publications as a 
scholar.  Block assessed the impact of those activities:  
Alibek supervised as many as 32,000 people (out of 60,000 in the 
program) at nearly 40 facilities spread throughout the Soviet Union, 
effectively a toxic archipelago.  Here the Soviets worked not only on 
perfecting ‘conventional’ biological weapons based on anthrax, glanders 
and plague, but also on weaponizing deadly (and highly contagious) 
viruses, such as smallpox, Marburg and Ebola.  In contrast to American 
bioweapons effort, the Soviets considered the best bioweapons agents to 
be those for which there are no prevention and no cure . . . the current 
economic and political climate in the former Soviet Union raises the 
disturbing likelihood that their bioweapons experts will be forced to seek 
employment elsewhere, resulting in unwelcome proliferation.42 
It is now widely reported that other nations may field these biological weapons of 
war for they have declared or have been suspected of the possession of biological 
weapons. 
 
B. A MEDICAL EXAMPLE 
To understand the importance of the work in controlling these biological weapons 
of war, an example of the physical consequences to an exposure to Bacillus anthrax is 
illustrative.  Anthrax, a widely publicized biological agent, is but one of the many 
biological select agents covered by the federal law governing select biological agents and 
toxins.  In a recent work of popular fiction, anthrax was portrayed as follows: 
Anthrax bacteria are as murderous as South American flesh-eating ants.  
An army of ants, traveling in the millions, can decimate an immobilized 
individual by devouring his flesh layer by layer.  Death is gradual and 
agonizing.  Anthrax bacilli do to the body from within what ants do from 
without.  They attack everywhere, shutting down and destroying the 
body’s functions from top to bottom.  The organisms continue to multiply 
and swarm until there is nothing left to feed on.  In 2 or 3 days a few 
thousand bacilli may become trillions.  At the time of death, as much as 30 
percent of a person’s blood weight may be live bacilli.  A microscopic 
cross section of a blood vessel looks as though it is teeming with worms.43  
                                                 
42 S. Block (2001). ‘The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons”. The American Scientist. Vol. 89, 
Number 1. 
43 L. Cole (2003) The Anthrax Letters: A Medical Detective Story.  Washington: John Henry Press. 
Page vii. 
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Anthrax, unlike so may other biological weapons of war, can be successfully 
treated if diagnosed early.  However, the public response (panic) to such a weapon’s use, 
or reported use, can far exceed the actual risk that such an agent poses to the public 
health.   The collapse of a modern society’s medical infrastructure, on both a local and 
regional basis, becomes a real possibility when encountering such widespread public 
panic.44  An illustrative example of such a threat to medical infrastructures occurred in 
June, 2001, in Akron, Ohio, where a suspected meningitis case caused the “worried well” 
to overwhelm the local medical system.  This fear of disease at a mass scale contributes 
to what is referred to Mass Sociogenic Illness (MSI).   
In an intriguing literature review45, Bartholomew and  Wessley maintain that 
Mass Sociogenic Illness (MSI) is underreported in the literature in English and that MSI 
mirrors prominent social concerns, changing in relation to context and circumstance. 
Prior to 1900, MSI reports were dominated by episodes of motor symptoms marked by 
dissociation, histrionics, and psychomotor agitation. A limited number of twentieth-
century reports feature anxiety symptoms that are triggered by exposure to an anxiety-
generating agent such as an innocuous odor or food poisoning rumors. From the early 
1980s until present there has been an increasing presence of chemical and biological 
terrorism themes within the study of MSI. 
 
C: THE TREATIES 
The League of Nations convened a Conference on the Control of the International 
Trade in Arms, Munitions, and War Materials in 1924.  That generally ineffective 
conference did achieve an enduring contribution to world peace, for the conference 
crafted a chemical agent of war treaty which included provisions addressing 
bacteriological or biological methods of war. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, properly known 
as the Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, 
                                                 
44 This case was incorporated into the prepared testimony of P. Quinlist, MD, MPH in her testimony 
of June 21, 2001 on Combating Terrorism:  Federal Response to Biological Weapons Attack before the 
Committee on Government Reform of the US House of Representatives.  Accessed on 13 August 2004 at 
http://www.bioterrrorism.slu.edu/bt/official/congress/quinlist072301.pdf. 
45 R.E. Bartholomew and S. Wessley (2002) “Protean Nature of Mass Sociogenic Illness: From 
Possessed Nuns to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Fears” British Journal of Psychiatry 180: 300-306. 
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and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare is now accepted as international customary 
law.  More than forty nation-states were involved in crafting the treaty that came into 
force in 1928. The Protocol states: 
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of 
all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by 
the general opinion of the civilized world; and Whereas the prohibition of 
such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of 
the world are Parties; and To the end that this prohibition shall be 
universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the 
conscience and the practice of nations;  
DECLARE:  
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to 
Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this 
prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to 
be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this 
declaration.46 
The other major international treaty relevant to the issue of biological weapons is 
the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).  President Nixon declared 
in 1969 that the United States would end its biological weapons program.  That prompted 
an international movement that culminated in the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention.  This convention, with 18 signatory nations and 146 state parties, provided 
significantly improved detailed guidance as compared to the 1925 Geneva Convention.  
The convention’s signatories and interested parties now meet every five years at review 
conferences to discuss compliance and consider amending the base treaty.  Since its 
initial adoption in Washington, London, and Moscow in 1972, the treaty signatories have 
pledged to realize the goals outlined in Article I: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances 
to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
                                                 
46 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of War (June 17, 1925).  Accessed 16 June 2004 
http://64.177.207.201/cbw/resources/index.htm. 
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(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents 
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
Supplementing the ongoing work of the BTWC has been the Australia Group.47  
This voluntary group of 30 nations began their work in 1984 as a result of chemical 
weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war.  The Australia Group seeks common export controls 
for chemical and biological weapon nonproliferation.  The group occasionally issues 
warnings seeking to alert the international community of chemical and biological weapon 
proliferation, shares warning lists of suspicious transactions, and alerts others of the risk 
of inadvertently aiding in biological weapons (BW) proliferation.  It is critical to note that 
the Australia Group has no charter or constitution and its work is achieved through 
consensus of the participant members.  While without formal status, the work of this non-
governmental organization has been recognized48 as a valuable international resource and 
an authority in the ongoing work to prevent biological weapon proliferation. 
The United States has sought to achieve ongoing compliance with treaty 
obligations as well as progressive control of biological weapons through a series of 
statutory laws, executive activities, and federal regulations. President Nixon announced 
on November 25, 1969, the unilateral and unconditional renouncement of biological 
weapons.  As President he terminated the biological warfare program and directed the 
Department of Defense to destroy all stockpiles of biological agents.  Yet, a loophole in  
that declaration required a clarification and specific termination of the toxin agent 
weapon research program and directed the Defense Department’s destruction of toxin 
agents and weapon stockpiles, with the provision that “The United States will confine its 
                                                 
47 The Australia Group has been actively engaged in the informal monitoring of biological and 
chemical weapons and is a considered a interested party and active Non Governmental Organization in the 
global non-proliferation effort, accessed on 10 July 2004 http://www.australiagroup.net/. 
48 The Australia Group has been recognized by groups as diverse as the United Nations, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace and The Arms Control Association.  An informative overview of their 
work is found at a Fact Sheet published by the Arms Control Association.  Accessed 13 December 2004 at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/australiagroup.asp. 
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military programs for toxins, whether produced by bacteriological or any other biological 
method or by chemical synthesis, to research for defensive purposes only, such as to 
improve techniques of immunization and medical therapy.”49  The United States 
completed the destruction of all stockpiles and weapons during the period May 1971 to 
May 1972. 
 
D. AMERICAN STATUTORY LAW 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Public Law 104-
132 was adopted on April 24, 1996, and criminalized the threatened use of a biological 
weapon.  Previously only the attempted use of such a weapon constituted a crime.  
AEDPA directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to “establish and maintain a 
list of each biological agent that has the potential to pose a severe threat to public health 
and safety.” 50  The Secretary was provided with criteria for that task to include: 
• The effect on human health of exposure to the agent; 
• the degree of contagiousness of the agent and the methods by which the  
agent is transferred to humans; 
• the availability and effectiveness of immunizations to prevent and 
treatments for any illness resulting from infection by the agent; and 
• any other criteria that the Secretary considers appropriate; and 
• consult with scientific experts representing appropriate professional 
groups. 
The General Accounting Office in November 2002 presented a clear summary of 
the AEDPA objectives as follows: 
• provide safeguards to prevent access to such agents for use in domestic or 
international terrorism or for other criminal purposes;  
• provide for the establishment and enforcement of safety procedures for the 
transfer of the listed biological agents, including measures to ensure 
                                                 
49 Although the extant literature refers to an Executive Order, this is a factual error for there is no 
February 14, 1970, Executive Order by President Richard Nixon on Biological Warfare.  The directive to 
renounce biological warfare was found within National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 35.  That 
declassified  NSDM is found at the National Security Archive  at George Washington University, accessed 
on 8 August 2004 at  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/#doc8. 
50 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Public Law 104-132, Enhanced Penalties and 
Control of Biological Agents, Section 511 (d) (1) A, 110 STAT. 1284. 
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proper training and appropriate skills to handle agents and proper 
laboratory facilities to contain and dispose of agents;  
• establish and maintain a list of biological agents that have the potential to 
pose a severe threat to public health and safety; and  
• provide for the establishment of procedures to protect the public safety in 
the event of an actual or potential illegal transfer of a biological agent.51 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107-56 
was adopted in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.  That 
law includes sections that strengthened the capabilities of intelligence agencies to detect 
terrorist activities and restricted foreign access to potentially dangerous materials and 
knowledge.  At section 175b, the term select agent is clarified as to not include any 
biological agent in its naturally occurring environment if the biological agent or toxin has 
not been cultivated, collected or otherwise extracted from its natural source.  At section 
416, foreign student access is clarified and regulated, and at section 817 the biological 
weapons statute is expanded to include the criminalization of the act of possession of a 
biological agent, toxin, or delivery system if not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, 
protective, bona fide research or other peaceful purpose. 
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 (BPARA), Public Law 107-188 was adopted on June 12, 2002.  This law modified  
the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ scope of responsibilities to include the 
review and publication of the list of select agents and toxins biennially, or more often as 
needed.  This legislation and its subsequent federal regulations address specifically the 
physical security practices at university biomedical research facilities using select agents. 
 
E. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS 
Within the American system, statutory objectives and goals are translated into 
action through the bureaucratic construction, adoption, and implementation of federal 
regulations.  Four specific sections within the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
structure that regulatory implementation of these statutory laws.  42 CFR 73 Department 
of Health and Human Services specifically addresses the possession, use and transfer of 
                                                 
51 General Accounting Office (GAO-03-315R).  November 2002. 
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select agents and toxins, while 9 CFR 121 and 7 CFR 331 Department of Agriculture 
address the possession, use, and transfer of biological agents within agriculture.  Finally, 
49 CFR 171-180 Department of Transportation specifies the shipping and packaging 
practices to be used with these select agents and toxins.  Within these voluminous federal 
regulations are the mandated reports and activities levied upon affected businesses, 
institutions, and individual scientists.  Included within the regulations are provisions for 
inspections, both announced and unannounced, and thorough self-reports of stolen or 
missing biological material.  
The initial regulations governing the Select Agent Program took effect on April 
15, 1997.  Those regulations include six components: 
1. Preparation of a list of select agents that pose a severe threat to public 
health and safety. 
2. Registration of facilities prior to the domestic transfer of select agents. 
3. Construction of a process to document successful transfer of agents. 
4. Implementation of audit, quality control and accountability mechanisms. 
5. Designation of select agent disposal requirements. 
6. Specification of research and clinical exceptions to the regulations. 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) designated primary responsibility for the Select Agent Program to the 
Office of External Activities within the Office of Health and Safety.  However, auditors 
from the General Accounting Office have discovered serious deficiencies in program 
administration in a study that reviewed program activities between November 2001 and 
September 2002.  Specifically the GAO found that CDC and HHS could strengthen the 
inspection and approval of facilities, the monitoring the shipment and transfer of select 
agents, and the accuracy of the CDC databases of registered facilities and select agent 
transfers. Their report of November 2002 noted “CDC can improve its management of 
the Select Agent Program to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access to biological 
agents. . . To better position CDC to reasonably ensure that appropriate security and 
safety precautions are in place for select agents, we made recommendations aimed at 
establishing proper internal control…”52 
                                                 
52 General Accounting Office. (2002) Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent 
Program.  GAO -03-315R.   
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The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002 (BPARA) significantly expanded the scope and responsibilities of the Select Agent 
Program. The General Accounting Office in November 2002 (GAO-03-315R) included a 
clear summary of the impact of  BPARA which: 
• requires all facilities possessing select agents to register with the Secretary 
of HHS, not just those facilities sending or receiving select agents; 
• restricts access to biological agents and toxins by persons who do not have 
a legitimate need and who are considered a risk by federal law 
enforcement and intelligence officials; 
• requires transfer registrations to include information regarding the 
characterization of agents and toxins to facilitate their identification, 
including their source; 
• requires the creation of a national database with information on all 
facilities and persons possessing, using, or transferring select agents; 
• directs the Secretary of HHS to review and publish the select agent list 
biennially, making revisions as appropriate to protect the public; and 
• requires the Secretary to impose more detailed and different levels of 
security for different select agents based on their assessed level of threat to 
the public. 
The challenge is clear.  If the CDC failed to successfully fulfill the regulatory 
tasks outlined in the 1996 legislation, as noted in the GAO report, then the expanded 
tasking found in these more recent regulations may well prove to be overwhelming. 53 
The CDC has acknowledged its Select Agent Program deficiencies54 and has set a very 
demanding compliance schedule for the estimated 11,000 regulated institutions under the 
scope of the 2002 law. 
 
F. THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
The regulation of human behavior has been the quest of government since the 
very earliest periods of organized behavior.  While the subject and nature of the 
                                                 
53 General Accounting Office. (2002) Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent 
Program.  GAO -03-315R.   p.5.  This report includes the telling statement that the Select Agent Program 
staff estimates that BPARA could result in “.  . . a tenfold expansion of their responsibilities because many 
more facilities possess select agents than those registered to transfer them so far.”  
54 Ibid, p.3.  The GAO report which was transmitted to HHS Secretary Thompson on November 22, 
2002, that  “In discussing these recommendations with CDC officials, they concurred and noted 
improvements planned or already in progress.” 
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regulation may be intrinsically political, the actual practice of regulation within the 
United States is often an attempt to be free of political overtones. 
In the national context, the first federal rule-making agency was the Interstate 
Commerce Commission established in 1887.  At first the growth of federal regulatory 
activity was slow, with significant focus on preventing monopoly abuse.55  The Anti-
Trust Division of the Department of Justice was not established until 1903, and was 
followed over the next three decades with slow expansion of regulatory bodies, Federal 
Reserve System (1913), Federal Trade Commission (1914) and the Federal Power 
Commission (1920). 
With the onset of the Great Depression, the federal government’s regulatory 
activities bloomed.  A plethora of “alphabet agencies” were formed to regulate specific 
areas within and activities of the economy, e.g. Federal Maritime Commission.  The 
enduring and real change of this era of regulation was the sizable expansion of the 
established governmental agencies’ regulatory powers.  For instance the Interstate 
Commerce Commission regulatory authority expanded in the 1930s from a primary focus 
on railroad regulation to include the regulation of intercity bus and the trucking 
industries. 
In the postwar era the very nature of federal regulation changed profoundly.  
Rather than focusing on a single industry or family of industries, the new regulatory 
agencies focused on specific problems rather than industries.  These agencies’ charters 
enabled their regulation of many varied industries and enterprises, e.g. the Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
The underlying concept in governmental regulation is the determination by the 
people, via congressional statutory authority and/or executive interest, to intervene in the 
private or public sectors to enhance the safety or security of the people as a whole. Such 
regulatory activity can take one of several forms, largely dependent upon the nature of 
the problem, the skills of the regulators, and the organizational traditions of the 
regulatory agency as well as a cornucopia of external pressures ranging from politically 
                                                 
55 A superb introduction to the federal regulatory process is found in chapter four of C.F. Bonser, et al 
(2000) American Public Policy Problems – Second Edition. Upper Saddle River:  Prentice Hall. 
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inclined interest groups to investigative media attention.  Sparrow56 outlines a dichotomy 
of regulatory styles; one consists of formal precise rules coupled with an adversarial or 
punitive relationship with the group being regulated while the other is softer in approach, 
more results oriented, with less attachment to formal rules and a distinct bias towards 
responsiveness using tools of negotiation, dialogue, and tradeoffs with the group being 
regulated. The regulatory cycle is found to follow certain distinct patterns, identified as 
“the pendulum of regulation”, a cycle in which regulations and regulatory practices 
follow the organizational maturation of the groups being subjected to such regulation. 
In the 1970s and 1980s scholars and practitioners sought to break free of this 
dichotomy.  Again, according to Sparrow, “Developing regulatory versatility, and 
learning to manage it, appears a more constructive notion than continuing to merely push 
or pull the regulatory pendulum.”57  In this new era, a variety of tools was applied to the 
regulatory craft as alternatives to mere rule enforcement.  Among them were:  
• Tripartism:  An approach which breaks the dyad between regulators and 
regulated by involving various third parties with practical interest in the 
regulated activity and the regulatory agencies.58 
• Information Strategies:  An approach which communicates the risks and 
risk factors to affected actors and others to encourage socially responsible 
behavior.59 
• Self-Regulation:  An approach in which regulated activities are deemed 
trustworthy to conduct self-inspections and audits subject to external 
verification.60 
The regulation of the biological select agent and toxin program during the period 
1997-2002 is especially interesting.  There was no singular regulatory approach used 
during this period, but rather the regulatory scheme was an effective admixture of  
tripartism, self-regulation and a focused information strategy.  There are several 
explanations for this success. First, a non-traditional enforcement agency, CDC, was 
                                                 
56 M. Sparrow,  The Regulatory Craft. (2000). Washington: Brookings Institute, pp. 34-43. 
57 M. Sparrow,  The Regulatory Craft. (2000). Washington: Brookings Institute, p. 39. 
58 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992) 
New York: Oxford University Press, p. 20. 
59 M. O’Hare, “Informational Strategies as Regulatory Surrogates” in Eugene Bardach (1982) Social 
Regulation: Strategies for Reform San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, p. 221. 
60 The United States Environmental Protection Agency has piloted a number of field tests involving 
self-regulation. 
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unexpectedly tasked with regulation of both public and private entities involved in 
research involving select biological agents and toxins; with no history as an enforcement 
agency, CDC was not confined in the regulatory strategies it chose to use.  Second, the 
regulatory scheme that was used with select agents was a visible attempt to blend the 
strengths of several regulatory strategies. The applicable regulations, 42 CFR 73, 
included both extremely precise and detailed rules (i.e., an extensive list of select agents 
and microscopic quantities subject to regulation) as well as significant elements of self-
regulation (the biosecurity section includes self-assessment and locally prepared 
compliance reports).  
 
G. FAST TRACK IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATIONS 
The federal regulations, 42 CFR 73, are built upon the authority of the  BPARA 
and set a very vigorous and demanding compliance schedule for the both the individual 
scientists and the public, private and not for profit organizations at which they worked, as 
described in Table 4. 
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The term “fast track” can be better understood by placing it into the current 
regulatory context.  Recently, a national newspaper outlined a typical timeline for the 
adoption of a rule and found that adoption usually takes a year, but one rule in ten takes 
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more than four years for adoption.  Typically regulations require six steps from passage 
of legislation until adoption of the final rule (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Six Stages of Federal Regulation Formulation and Adoption 
Process Stage Activity Typical Time Period 
Stage 1 Congress passes legislation 
that requires a new rule or 
rule change; or a federal 
Judge orders revision to a 
rule by lawsuit; or a federal 
agency initiates routine rule 
revisions. 
Small or routine rules can 
be written quickly, while 
large complex rules can 
take years. 
Stage 2 Proposed Rules are 
published in the Federal 
Register; important rules 
require prior approval of the 
Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB). 
Proposed rules, once 
approved by OMB as 
required, are immediately 
published to the Federal 
Register. 
Stage 3 Agencies collect comments 
from the public, interest 
groups, other government 
agencies and members of 
Congress. 
The comment period 
typically lasts 30-90 days.  
Redrafting of proposed 
rules may take years. 
Stage 4 Agencies publish final 
regulation in the Federal 
Register; agencies may be 
required to obtain approval 
by OMB. 
Final regulations take effect 
upon publication or after a 
specified waiting period 
designated within the 
regulation. 
Stage 5 Agencies notify the 
Congress of major 
regulations.  Congress may 
exercise authority to 
overturn a rule with a 
resolution of disapproval.  
Congress has sixty days to 
overturn a regulation via 
resolution of disapproval. 
Stage 6 A rule is implemented. To overturn a rule, the 
process begins again at 
Stage 1. 
Source:  Goldstein and Cohen (2004) “The Rules That Apply”  The Washington Post National Weekly 
Edition.  August 23-29, 2004, Page 6. 
 
As might be anticipated, the groups, scientists, and scholars subject to this 
regulation were far from unanimous in their support of these regulations. The biomedical 
academic community is robustly diverse and far from a unified whole.  The community 
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differs along many lines including academic discipline, physical research capabilities and 
priorities, as well as the perception of the threat posed by biological agents in terrorism.  
On the issue of bioterrorism, Steven Block, a prominent biologist and physicist on faculty 
at Stanford University wrote in 2001: 
The community of biologists in the United States has maintained a kind of 
hand wringing silence on the ethics of creating bioweapons, a reluctance 
to talk about it with the public, even a disbelief that it’s happening.  
Biological weapons are a disgrace to biology.  The time has come for top 
biologists to assert their leadership and speak out, to take responsibility on 
behalf of their profession for the existence of these weapons and the 
means of protecting the populations against them, just as leading 
physicists did a generation ago when nuclear weapons came along.  Moral 
pressure costs nothing and can help; silence is unacceptable now. 61 
In contrast to that view, Richard H. Ebright, a molecular biologist on faculty at 
Rutgers’s Waksman Institute noted in a recent interview:   
The labs [Biosafety Level 4 laboratories] are a perilous overreaction to an 
inflated threat and will do more harm than good.  Although the threat of 
biological warfare is real, the weapons used by terrorists are unlikely to be 
the next-generation agents that the high-security labs are intended to 
study. . .by increasing the availability of such pathogens…the labs will 
bring that threat to fruition…It’s arming our opponents. . .It’s [the 
acquisition of Biosafety Level 4 laboratories] the easiest way to bring 
$100 million to your university.62 
The biomedical academic community was not actively writing about bioterrorism 
to any significant extent prior to 1997.  Saint Louis University’s Center for the Study of 
Bioterrorism63has prepared select bibliographies on the scholarly work in the field of 
bioterrorism.  Those bibliographies clearly indicate the trends in academic interest in 
biological weapons. During the period of 1980-1989, 92 articles on the subject were cited 
with that number rising to 109 for the 1990-1997 period.  By dramatic contrast in 1998 
alone 67 articles were cited with the number rising to 131 in 1999, 110 in  2000,  and 108  
in 2001 respectively.   
                                                 
61 Block, p. 11. 
62 W. Broad. (2004)  “In a Lonely Stand, A Scientist Takes On National Security Dogma” The New 
York Times.  June 29, 2004. D 1. 
63 The Saint Louis University’s Center is an internationally recognized research source on this arcane, 
but important, aspect of national defense.  Their work on compiling bibliographical resources was accessed 
on 10 August 2003 at http://www.slu.edu/colleges/sph/csbei/bioterrorism/bibliography.htm. 
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With the onset of demanding federal regulations both in 1996 and in 2002, the 
academic community was stirred to vigorous response to the proposed federal 
regulations.  The Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, consulted 
with professional associations when she prepared the initial list of select agents in 1996-
1997 as directed by the AEDPA.  List making was very controversial, even with the 
inclusion of the recognized professional associations in the process.  
A draft list generated nearly 70 letters, and the CDC responded by 
dropping agents such as Western equine encephalitis virus and a bacterium 
called Chlamydia psittaci and adding equine morbillivirous and a fungus 
called Coccidioides immitis”.64  
Active participation in relevant rule-making and federal regulation by affected 
parties is not uncommon, but the vigor and the total number of responses from the 
academic community and related professional organizations to the select biological 
agents and toxins list certainly indicates the gravity of the issue of such regulation of 
science. 
The enforcement of the biosecurity regulations, including criminal sanctions was 
not long in coming.  In July 2002, a University of Connecticut graduate student, Tomas 
Foral, was the first person charged under the USA PATRIOT Act with possessing a 
biological agent without a “reasonably justified purpose”65.  Foral recovered five vials of 
anthrax (wet form) during the inventory process, yet instead of autoclaving all the vials as 
instructed, Foral retained two vials of anthrax in his freezer in the university’s 
pathobiology laboratory.  Federal authorities received an anonymous tip from a student 
but delayed their investigation until after the inhalational anthrax death of an elderly 
Connecticut women in November 200166.  Authorities found the marked vials in a 
pathobiology building with broken door locks, stored within an unattended freezer  
equipped with a lock but the key left in the lock.   
                                                 
64 M. Enserink and D. Malakoff (2001). “Congress Weighs Select Agent Update.”  Science.  
November 16, 2001. 
65 D. Altimari. (2002).  “ Student Who Kept Anthrax Charged”.  Hartford Courant. July, 23, 2002.  
Accessed on 24 December 2004 at http://www.ctnow.com/about/hc-archives.htmlstory.  and 
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/studentkeptanthrax.html. 
66University of California at Los Angeles, Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health. 
(2001). American Anthrax Outbreak of 2001, Case 23.  Accessed on 24 December 2004 at 
http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/detect/antdetect_case23.html. 
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Foral accepted pre-trial diversion, for the federal Grand Jury failed to issue an 
indictment to the US Attorney.  On November 20, 2002, Foral was placed on pre-trial 
diversion and received six months probation and 96 hours of community service. As the 
Foral case indicates, microbiologists were moving to the forefront of interest to federal 
law enforcement authorities, as they sought assistance with the investigation of the 
Anthrax attacks of the autumn of 2001.  Ronald Atlas, then president of the American 
Society of Microbiology, remarked that “The scientific community has been put on 
notice that we have to watch what we do.”67  
On December 10, 2002, the CDC posted the Interim Final Rule to comply with 
the provisions of the BPARA.  The proposed rule was eighty-four pages in length and 
broadened the scope of affected institutions from an initial estimate of 200 to 250 
institutions to a revised estimate of 1,653 institutions. A detailed critique of the rule was 
submitted under the aegis of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute in January 2003 and 
was more than eleven pages in length.  This group of researchers identified primary flaws 
in the definitions of Responsible Official and Access as well as significant disagreement 
with the scope, purpose and utility of the required security plans.68  Professional groups 
and academic scientists expressed concern in 2002 on several topics.   
First, there was significant disagreement about the inclusion of some agents and 
toxins on the Select Agent List, much of it lingering from the 1997 discussions. 
“Although such legislation is probably appropriate, the CDC’s ‘watch list’ contains many 
organisms, such as fungus Coccifioides immitis, that are unlikely candidates for 
biological weapons”69.   Second, many scientists accused university administrators of 
overreaction to the anthrax events of the autumn of 2001 and the subsequent gross 
misapplication of the provisions of the BPARA in 2002.  As Mestel wrote:  
Biologists understand that times, and laws, have changed. . .the response 
by university administrators and authorities – who are not, after all, 
                                                 
67 R. Mestel. ( 2002).  “In the Lab: Suspicion Spreads”.  The Los Angeles Times. August 28, 2002. 
68 CDC. (2003). Public Comments on New Regulation, 03-SAR-013. 
69 J. Fierer and T. Kirkland (2002). “Questioning the CDC’s ‘select agent’ criteria”.  Science. January 
4, 2002. 
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microbiologists – have been driven by an inflated fear of the bacterium 
itself.  The reaction…has been far out of proportion to the actual risk…70  
The cost of compliance with new law and regulations was deemed quite 
significant by several academic administrators.  Malakoff observes:  
After 11 September; however, convenience and efficiency gave way to 
security.  Across the country, in hundreds of ways both large and small, 
US academic researchers are feeling the effects of that catastrophic day on 
their ability to carry out science . . . eager to plug security gaps, Congress 
and agency officials have set tight deadlines for complying with the new 
regulations…the incentive to get it right is very high because universities 
and researchers who don’t comply face stiff, potentially criminal 
penalties.”71   
That observation was echoed by a near panicked researcher who commented that 
“No one is sure what will constitute a satisfactory security plan…at many institutions, 
budget plans for new laboratory security systems run into hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.” 72 
The Code of Federal Regulations, 42 CFR 73.11 requires that an entity, for 
example a university with a biomedical research laboratory, “must develop and 
implement a security plan establishing policy and procedures that ensure the security of 
areas containing select agents and toxins.”  The regulations require that the security plan 
be the result of the definition of threats, examination of vulnerabilities and the mitigation 
of those vulnerabilities through a security systems approach.  The security plan must 
address each of these eight points: 
(1) Describe inventory control procedures, minimal education and experience 
criteria for those individuals with access to select agents or toxins, 
physical security, and cyber security; 
(2) Contain provisions for routine cleaning, maintenance and repairs; 
provisions for training personnel in security procedures; provisions for 
securing the area (e.g. card access, key pads, locks) and protocols for 
changing access numbers or locks following staff changes; 
(3) Describe procedures for loss or compromise of keys, passwords, 
combinations, etc; 
                                                 
70 Mestel, page 3. 
71 D. Malakoff (2002). “Congress adopts tough rules for labs.”  Science.  May 31, 2002. 
72 P. Reinhart (2003).  “New Select Agent Rules Will be Costly for Research Universities”. NCURA 
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(4) Contain procedure for reporting suspicious persons or activities, loss or 
theft of listed agents or toxins, release of listed agents or toxins, or 
alteration of inventory records; 
(5) Contain provisions for the control of access to containers where listed 
agents and toxins are stored; and procedures for reporting and removing 
unauthorized persons; 
(6) Contain provisions for ensuring that all individuals with access, including 
workers and visitors, understand security requirements and are trained and 
equipped to follow established procedures; 
(7) Establish procedures for reporting and removing unauthorized persons; 
and 
(8) Establish procedures for securing the area when individuals approved 
under section 73.8 are not present (e.g. card access system, key pads 
locks) including protocols for changing access numbers or locks following 
staff changes. 
The development and implementation of these specific security plans, especially 
in an age when violation of the regulations can result in both civil fines and criminal 
prosecution, has presented a true challenge to biomedical research scientists at various 
universities throughout the nation.  The regulations controlling the use and storage of 
select biological agents and toxins were remarkable on several grounds.  First, the 
communities subject to regulation, primarily microbiology and biomedical research 
institutions, were far from convinced that regulation was necessary or desirable.  Second, 
in contrast to a standard federal regulation adoption timeline of one to four years, as 
described earlier at Tables 4 and 5, the select biological agent and toxins regulation was 
adopted and implemented within nine months.  Third, the costs to achieve compliance 
with the security plans were a seriously underestimated burden to many universities.  In 
the next chapter, the experiences of two separate biomedical research institutions will be  
examined in order to assess the challenges posed by these new federal regulations and the 
enduring impact of these regulations on American biomedical research.  
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IV. THE CASE STUDIES 
This chapter explores local compliance with BPARA as expressed in the 
regulatory requirements at 42 CFR 73.  The analysis focuses on two geographically 
adjacent, but distinct biomedical research institutions during the period 2001-2003.  The 
two institutions have different purposes and missions, yet both are subject to federal law 
and regulation, for both are engaged in research using biological select agents and toxins.  
Federal and state law and regulations pertaining to confidentiality presented a challenge 
in this research effort.  That challenge was overcome, thus allowing the unrestricted 
distribution of this thesis, by referring to the institutions studied as “the school" and “the 
hospital” with no other identifying features included. Each institutional experience was 
explored using a case study format.  That format includes a brief overview of each 
institution’s purpose, the specific instances of select agent use, the initial compliance 
strategies pursued, and the success of those strategies over the short term.  The specific 
interview questions can be found at Appendix C.  This overview will be followed by a 
comparison of the experiences of the two institutions with a preliminary discussion of the 
cost effectiveness as well as the marginal costs of meeting the federally mandated 
biosecurity requirements.   
 
A. CASE STUDY:  THE SCHOOL 
The school case study references a state supported medical school located at a 
graduate public university within a major urban center.  That medical school was founded 
in 1969 and graduated its first class of physicians in 1971.  The stated mission of the 
school is: 
The mission of the Medical School is to provide the highest quality 
education and training of future physicians for the state, in harmony with 
the state’s diverse population; to conduct the highest caliber of research in 
the biomedical and health sciences; and to provide exemplary clinical 
services73 
                                                 
73  Factbook (2004).   
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The medical school, hereafter referred to as “the school”, is the major academic 
component of a state university that also includes a consortium of graduate schools 
including a School of Health Informatics, School of Nursing, Dental Branch, and 
Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences.  The school has a faculty of 1,215, a student 
enrollment of 3,417, and receives operational and support services from the university. 
The school is a recipient of private, state, and federal grants, of which primary federal 
grants and contracts sources are the National Institutes of Health, US Department of 
Agriculture, National Science Foundation, and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration.74 The school received total funds in the amount of $312,533,000 in FY 
2004.  Within that budget the school received $57,465,000 (18 %) in grants and contracts.  
This is a significant increase over previous grant and contract funding for the school.  For 
example in FY 2000 the total funds budget was $240,000,000 which included  
$36,423,000 (15 %) in grants and contracts.  
The school hosts a variety of ongoing basic and applied research projects that 
include select agents and toxins.  A current primary investigator whose work on Bacillus 
anthracis has been underway since 198375, has been registered with the CDC since 1997 
as a researcher who occasionally exchanged samples of B. anthracis  with other 
microbiologists throughout the nation.    
The school has an active environmental health and safety component, a functional 




                                                 
74 The Factbook (2004) at Budget and Research sections include comparative information both over 
time (1995-2004) for the institution and with other major biomedical research grant recipients within the 
state. 
75 A detailed discussion of Koehler’s views and considerations of the general policy implications of 
recent federal law and biosecurity regulations from a civil libertarian viewpoint can be found at P. Thomas 
(2003) “ From Saviors to Suspects: New Threats to Infectious Disease Research” in R. C. Leone and G. 
Anrig, Jr., eds. (2003) The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism.  New York:  
Century Foundation.   
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“. . .to work in conjunction with the community and ensure that education, 
research, and health-care related activities take place in conditions that are optimally safe 
and healthy for students, faculty, staff, visitors, surrounding community, and general 
public.”76   
The school receives direct support from that university unit and the Biological 
Safety Officer actively partnered with the primary researchers in establishing viable 
compliance with the federal regulations.  It was noted during interviews, that the 
compliance challenge encountered with conformance to the new federal biosecurity 
regulations was three fold.  First, primary investigators, the lead biomedical research 
scientists, were “less than enthused” about changing laboratory practices and even the 
physical environment to comply with the new regulations77.  Second, the 2002 
regulations required the inventory of all biological select agents and toxins as an early 
deliverable to the regulatory agency (CDC).78 Third, the design and maintenance of an 
effective system to track ongoing compliance with these federal regulations was not a 
simple accomplishment. 79 That system required initial software engineering, data input, 
data quality control, system redundancy, system or cyber-security, and reliable and valid 
information acquisition methods within a dynamic and resistive environment of academic 
research scientists.   
The school’s Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) function initially became 
aware of the proposed 2002 regulations through a variety of sources in the early summer 
                                                 
76 The school’s EHS support is provided by the university, an institutional economy of scale is 
realized through a centralized EHS function at a biomedical research university.  Tasked with responsibility 
for biological, chemical, radiation safety, environmental and fire safety as well as risk management, the 
HSC EHS is recognized for excellence throughout the university.  
77 Interview with the Biological Safety Officer at the School remarkably mirrored the comments made 
by  Thomas (2003) who noted  after interviewing leading biomedical researchers and microbiologists 
concerning federal biosecurity regulations that “Complaints about increased red tape and paperwork are 
universal among scientists who work with select agents”, p.200. 
78 This was a serious change in federal regulations, while previously regulations (in conformance with 
the 1996  Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Public Law 104-132) registration was required 
for those researchers who shipped select agents and toxins to other laboratories, the 2002 regulations 
required a comprehensive inventory of all select agents and toxins possessed for use in all research 
activities. 
79 Interviews with the Biological Safety Officer revealed that after  massive investment of labor hours 
to achieve initial compliance (estimated at 1800 labor hours between 2002-2003 split among the primary 
investigator <researcher>, the Biological Safety Officer and the university police), he notes that ongoing 
maintenance of compliance  requires near daily involvement with the laboratory staff and the university 
police.  Interviews conducted on November 11, 2003 and October 4, 2004. 
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of 2002.  Several staff members of the Environmental Health and Safety function are 
active members of numerous professional associations, including the American Society 
of Microbiologists (ASM) which was directly involved in the formulation of these federal 
regulations.  The society regularly advised its membership regarding changes in pending 
regulations in advance of the release of the proposed rules.  In addition, as a major 
recipient of federal biomedical research grants, the school regularly received information 
alerts from the CDC.  The school’s EHS staff pursued an aggressive information 
campaign to alert all researchers of the pending regulations and the forecasted impact on 
their laboratory activities.  In addition, a series of executive briefings were conducted by 
the school to include executives both at the local and regional levels, including senior 
university executive staff. 
The school was one of the first institutions within the United States subjected to a 
federal compliance audit which included an intensive on-site inspection of their facility to 
assess conformance with federal regulations found at 42 CFR 73.  That on-site inspection 
was conducted in May 200380.  However, prior to that on-site, especially with the critical 
link between the specific select agent used in the ongoing biomedical research at the 
school, Bacillus anthracis, and the nation-wide concern with apparent criminal use of 
anthrax beginning in the autumn of 2001, increased attention had been focused on the 
security of that specific laboratory.  To enhance physical security measures as well as to 
comply with the federal regulatory requirements the university installed and upgraded the 
electronic security devices used to control access to the lab suite.81   
                                                 
80 This multi-day on-site included interviews, observations, and records review by a team of 
inspectors from the CDC.  All participants (the primary investigator, EHS and the university police) were 
tasked to prove their compliance with the regulations.  The experiences gained during this on-site were 
shared with other similar institutions throughout the region and nation. 
81 The laboratory is located in the medical school, a facility that has both controlled perimeter access 
and on-site armed peace officers and unarmed guards assigned to the facility.  The author increased the 
directed patrols of the lab suites in October 2001 and those patrols continue to this date.  The university 
police scoped, designed, installed, and continue to maintain several electronic security systems including 
closed circuit televisions, card access entry, and intrusion alarms in the winter-spring of 2003.  
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Nevertheless, physical security measures, while certainly a very visible 
manifestation of biosecurity, are but one of several elements of an effective biosecurity 
strategy.82 
Essential regulatory compliance was achieved through a comprehensive education 
and information campaign waged by EHS, coupled with multi-disciplinary activities 
relentlessly pursued by the school.  The Biological Safety Officer alerted the university 
community of the new regulations.  He planned and conducted a comprehensive 
inventory of all select agents and toxins.  This required in-person discussion with the 
primary investigators as all select agents and toxins were accounted for throughout all 
laboratories across a geographically disjointed campus.  The Biological Safety Officer, in 
coordination with the primary investigator and the crime prevention staff of the university 
police planned and conducted laboratory training of staff on the new regulations which 
included an audit and revisions of laboratory procedures manuals.  He maintains today an 
automated and password protected database on the location and amounts of select agents 
and toxins on campus. The plan to achieve regulatory compliance was multi-phased and 
took several months to achieve success in the 2002-2003 time frame.    
 
B. CASE STUDY:  THE HOSPITAL 
In this case study, the cancer center, referred to hereafter as “the hospital”, is a 
unique, university affiliated medical institution whose stated mission is:  
. . .to eliminate cancer in Texas, the nation, and the world through outstanding 
programs that integrate patient care, research and prevention, and through 
education for undergraduate and graduate students, trainees, professionals, 
employees and the public. 
The hospital was founded upon a philanthropic gift to the state from a successful 
businessman, which was further supported by the state legislature.  The hospital has 
grown from a few rooms in a personal residence in 1943 to a multi-site, comprehensive                                                  
82 A common and relevant aphorism within the crime prevention community is “Locks keep only the 
honest people out”.  The deterrent effect of such electronic security systems is difficult if not impossible to 
quantify and measure.  Additionally, the technical training of the users of such installed systems continues 
to be an issue; a high rate of false alarms (both intrusions and door held-open alarms) are experienced as 
new personnel are joined to the laboratory.  The efficacy of the “guns, guards, and gates” approach to 
biosecurity was questioned in the American Biological Safety Association’s paper - ABSA Biosecurity 
Task Force White Paper: Understanding Biosecurity January 2003.  Accessed on 23 October 2004 at 
http://www.absa.org/0301bstf.html. 
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cancer center with an annual budget that exceeds $1.7 billion83 The hospital takes 
pride in the quality of its research-driven patient care; in FY 2004 the physicians and 
surgeons performed 12,463 surgical procedures, had 20,608 patient admissions, and 
605,848 outpatient visits.  It has earned an international reputation for the world-class 
quality of its science.  Applied biomedical research is a fundamental focus for this 
institution.  The hospital received  $164,000,000 in federal grants in 2003 and notes that 
“Nearly 50% of our current research funding comes from NIH grants and contracts. . .”84  
This funding level has increased more than 143% during the last five years. 
The hospital has an employee population of 14,250 and employs 663 physicians 
and research physicians (M.D./Ph.D.) and 368 (Ph.D.) basic scientists.  These scientists 
engage in a remarkable number of biomedical research activities which include 12,332 
patients enrolled in clinical trials.  In addition it received 208 National Cancer Institute 
grants, nine Specialized Programs of Research Excellence (SPORES) grants, and 24 
training grants85.  The faculty has outlined seven research themes to guide an ongoing 
and diverse research agenda.  Research theme seven was identified as “to continue to 
pursue research on cancer in each of the major organ sites and explore new diagnostic 
and therapeutic approaches to these cancers.” 
The hospital became aware of pending federal biosecurity regulations through a 
variety of professional organizations sources including the American Biological Safety 
Organization and the American Society of Microbiology, as well as through 
communication from the Centers for Disease Control.  The hospital’s Biological Safety 
Officer, during a period of major staff turnover, exercised due diligence and engaged the 
hospital research community, primarily basic research scientists, in an information 
exchange about the new regulations and the forecasted regulatory impact on the 
individual researchers and their laboratories.  That information exchange was time 
sensitive and intensive in volume.   
The hospital’s compliance officer, a senior executive who is by professional 
training an attorney, was involved in both the information exchange and the status of the 
                                                 
83 Chief Financial Officer’s FY 2004 Hospital Quick Reference Data. 
84 President’s Annual Address of October 18, 2004, p. 21. 
85 Ibid, p. 8. 
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compliance efforts.  The inventory of all biological agents and toxins was a critical first 
step for the hospital and was the most time intensive of all steps of regulatory compliance 
plan.  Remarkably the hospital was actively involved in the inventory of biological agents 
and toxins as an element of the institution’s general upgrade in safety practices prior to 
the adoption of the federal regulations in 200286.  The hospital’s senior executive staff 
initiated that inventory to address the concern that while they had a comprehensive 
inventory of chemicals used and stored throughout the laboratories, an inventory verified 
through quarterly“zip rounds”87, they were less confident about their possession of 
biological agents and toxins. 
However, as a major biomedical research facility whose primary focus is applied 
research in cancer treatment, compliance with the federal regulations concerning select 
biological agents and toxins was never an issue of substantive controversy at the hospital 
as it was at the school.   The hospital has a single reportable biological select agent and 
toxin currently in possession - Staphylococcal Entertoxin B (SEB)88 which is a toxin used 
as a test marker in cancer research.  The SEB is maintained in very limited amounts and 
securely stored in an industrial deep freezer within a research laboratory.  The major 
compliance problem encountered at the hospital was the difficulty of securing the active 
cooperation from the various research scientists. These scientists apparently did not 
perceive the task of a biological agent and toxin inventory to be a significant priority.   
In retrospect, this apathy has been attributed to the fact that such substances were 
rarely possessed or used by these biomedical researchers in their work with cancer. The 
preponderance of the non-compliant researchers89 believed that the failure to submit a 
written response to the EHS constituted a negative response and they felt no pressure to 
                                                 
86 The hospital pursued and achieved ISO 14001 status in 2002.  This was a voluntary accreditation 
effort of the Environmental Health and Safety function by external regulatory authorities. 
87 Zip rounds are conducted unannounced quarterly throughout the institution.  These rounds involved 
safety specialists who assess ongoing compliance with institutional and professional standards of practice 
involving laboratory safety at the active research laboratories.  Zip Rounds are reported to various 
institutional governance bodies. 
88 Staphylococcal Entertoxin B is found to be “one of the best-studied and, therefore, best-understood 
toxins” and it is attributed to be one of the common causes of food poisoning by E Medicine Consumer 
Health’s Bioterrorism and Warfare. Accessed on 26 October 2004 at 
http://www.emedicinehealth.com/articles/15704-5.asp. 
89 The Biological Safety Program Manager had estimated non-compliance to involve less than 100 of 
the more than 800 Primary Investigators at the hospital.  
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devote any further time to another set of inquiries from the university’s support staff.  
The Biological Safety Officer and her staff overcame that apathy by making scheduled 
visits and conducting thorough inventories of the more than 800 active laboratories 
throughout the university90.  It is interesting to note that the thorough and detailed 
inventories did uncover unexpected possession of some biological select agents in the 
laboratory freezers, attributed to legacy inventories that occurred as generations of 
research scientists occupied similar laboratory spaces within the institution.  The 
biological agent and toxin inventory facilitated a long overlooked yet desirable laboratory 
clean out within the institution.  Legacy biological agents and toxins, some decades old,  
were disposed of in conformance with professional standards by qualified biological 
safety professionals. 
Regulatory compliance was not a significant issue for the hospital, for the nature 
of the research currently conducted does not include the routine use of select agents and 
toxins91. The hospital does undergo regular compliance audits from a series of public and 
private regulatory agencies each year.  Due to the nature of some research, federal 
regulations permit specified entities, in this case a biomedical research institution, 
exemptions for specific toxins held in certain amounts92.  The hospital’s research 
activities made it eligible for these exemptions.  As a result, the hospital incurred limited 
expenses in establishing compliance with these new biosecurity regulations.  The major 
costs consisted of the creation of a secure automated database and the replacement of an 
industrial-grade laboratory deep-freezer.  
 
                                                  
90 These inventories were in fact challenging exercises.  In contrast to chemicals that are stored on 
accessible shelves and cabinets in active research laboratories, the inventory of biological agents and toxins 
frequently required accessing storage trays within large industrial deep freezers and cross referencing 
marked specimen vials and containers with some idiosyncratic laboratory numbering systems designed by 
various Primary Investigators over the last forty years. 
91 Due to the nature and frequency of various governmental and professional compliance assessments 
and audits, the hospital has a separate official and support staff tasked as the institutional compliance 
officer. 
92 The applicable federal regulation, 42 CFR 73 at Section 73.5 at f Exclusions Subsection (4)  notes 
that the regulations do not include “…the following toxins (in the purified form or in combination of pure 
and impure forms) if the aggregate amount under the control of a principal investigator does not, at any 
time, exceed the amount specified: 0.5 mg of Botulinum neurotoxins; 5 mg of Staphylococcal entertoxins; 
100 mg of Clostridium perfringerns epsilon toxin; 100 mg of Shigatoxin; or 1,000 mg T-2 toxin. 
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C. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION 
The two cases outlined above indicate two different but equally effective  
regulatory compliance strategies.  Both cases evoke the significant concern regarding 
dual use in biomedical research.   These diverse research entities pursued approaches to 
compliance that produced equal success while involving radically different substances.  
Their successes were not coincidental and can be largely attributed to both institutions’ 
affiliation with a single umbrella organization, a university system.  The university 
system staff methodically informed all member institutions from the outset of the new 
regulatory “fast track” approach to biological select agents and toxins.  The system  
prepared a singular response to the federal regulations during the comment period93, 
outlining both academic and biomedical research community concerns about these 
regulations and the unintended consequences of biosecurity. 
A comparison of the experiences of these two institutions, as outlined in Table 6,  
is illustrative of many of the critical similarities in their responses to the enhanced 
regulation of research involving select biological agents and toxins.  
 
Table 6. Comparison of Institutional Responses to Federal Regulations of Biological 
Select Agents and Toxins at Selected Sites 
Topical Area School Hospital 
Major recipient of federal 




Health and Safety function  
Yes Yes 
Advanced notice of 
regulatory intent 
Yes Yes 
Response to the proposed 
rules filed with the CDC 
Yes Yes 
Inventory completed in 
compliance with the 
regulations. 
Yes Yes 
Inventory reduced total 
number of select agents and 
Yes Yes 
                                                 
93 Discussions with EHS staff at both institutions revealed both had input into the consensus document 
submitted by  university system.  The system convened a study group that regularly met via teleconference 
and in person during the 2001-2003 timeframe preparing the system’s terrorism response plans and a single 
comprehensive response to the proposed federal biosecurity regulations. 
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Federal compliance audit  Yes No 
Source:  Interviews with Principals conducted in October 2004 
Cost is a critical factor in any discussion of programs or a comparison of 
responses to federal regulations, yet complete or total costs can be elusive to track, for 
they consist of both direct as well as indirect elements.  For example, the purchase of a 
new deep freezer for SEB would be a direct cost while the maintenance of a software 
program that tracks the inventory of select biological agents and toxins would be an 
indirect cost, in that the software program also performs a series of other environmental 
heath and safety tasks.  Both the school and the hospital incurred unanticipated costs in 
establishing compliance with these federal regulations pertaining to biosecurity.   
It would be naïve and generally irresponsible to limit the understanding of 
biosecurity costs solely to monetary expenditures.  Responsible calculations of 
biosecurity costs must include as well opportunity costs.  In both cases such opportunity 
costs are expressed  within the context of public research universities, and those 
opportunity costs can be translated into other biomedical research activities or 
educational activities that were deferred or eliminated as a result of these funds and 
resources being allocated to the achievement of federal biosecurity mandates. Another 
consideration is  the quantification and value of primary researchers’ time. The time of 
these uniquely trained and educated basic research scientists spent on biosecurity 
compliance is arguably time lost and time never to be recovered.  While we can capture 
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an estimated value of their time in monetary terms, such a calculation fails to fully 
capture the delays in research caused by these regulations.94  
Based upon principal interviews and supporting documentation95 the costs of 
compliance with biosecurity regulations can be estimated as listed in Table 7.   
 
Table 7. Selected Costs of Biosecurity Compliance, 2002-2003 
Cost Center School Hospital 
Specialized Labor –EHS 
Specialized Labor - PD 





  200 hrs 
1040 hrs 
Equipment – Laboratory Biosafety Cabinet 
New cleanable  chairs and 
stools 
Specialized Rotors 
Industrial Storage Freezer 
Equipment – Security Card Access Doors 
Closed Circuit Television 
system and recording 
devices  
Intrusion and Panic Alarms 
None 
Facilities Remodeling Construction planning for a 
BSL 3 Lab 
None 
Source:  Author Interviews and Documentation Review with Principals in October 2004. 
By comparison, the school incurred substantially more costs due to the nature of 
the select agent used in its setting and the active research program executed  by the 
primary investigator.  In both cases the opportunity costs are difficult to quantify, for time 
devoted to compliance activities is time unavailable for active research and educational 
activities by the researcher.  In summary, these costs were the result of choice made in 
order to continue active research using these agents. 
Turning to another important aspect of the discussion of compliance with the 
biosecurity regulations, a question arises as to whether the funds that were expended in 
this effort can be assessed as to efficiency.  The qualified answer is yes.  Efficiency, as a                                                   
94 This point was articulately made by the School’s Biological Safety Officer who remarked that the 
ongoing compliance efforts caused one Basic Research Scientist to state that her research productivity has 
markedly declined as she has implemented the mandated biosecurity measures at her laboratory. 
95 For the period 2002-2004, institutional biological safety staff provided the listed estimates of direct 
and selected indirect costs during interviews.  While subject to some bias, both principals provided the 
information freely and without reservations.  The specificity of the information provided meets the purpose 
of this work. 
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term often used in discussions of public agency performance, yet has a tendency to lend 
itself to partisanship, but efficiency can be defined as the relationship between the work 
performed and the resources required to perform that work.96  An underlying concern is 
the value of efficiency as the best metric to use in evaluating the implementation of  
biosecurity as an element of the national defense strategy in a homeland security context.  
While our homeland security efforts should not be wasteful or exempt from the normal 
expectations of fiduciary responsibility, efficiency may not be the most appropriate 
performance metrics.   
In the final analysis, at both the school and the hospital, full compliance with the 
federal regulations involving biosecurity was achieved.  As noted in the earlier 
discussion,  both the school and the hospital dedicated  significant specialized labor 
efforts to achieving compliance with the biosecurity regulations.  The variance between 
the school’s 1800 hours and the hospital’s 3320 hours in 2002-2003 can be explained by 
the variance in the scope of the task at the two institutions.  For example, the hospital has 
more than 800 separate laboratories which were subject to the inventory for select agents 
and toxins.   
Equity is the final element to be used for comparison in the two cases, and for the 
purposes of this discussion equity will be defined as fairness and impartiality97.  The 
federal biosecurity regulations were imposed on all entities that possess biological agents 
and toxins.  However, those same regulations are also steeped with a variety of 
inconsistencies, exceptions, and exemptions that call into question the fundamental equity 
of the regulatory attempts.     
                                                 
96 Efficiency was the goal of much of 20th century public and private enterprise.  This definition is a 
meta-definition based largely upon the performance measurement work done by David Ammons and Harry 
Hatry as outlined at these two primary websites accessed on 15 September 2004 at  
http://www.ci.concord.nc.us/downloads/budget03/Performance_Measurement2nd.pdf. and 
http://newark.rutgers.edu/~ncpp/cdgp/Manual.htm. 
97 Equity has long been a topic of contentious discussion in philosophical, economic and legal circles. 
The discussion can be traced back to Aristotle, who discusses equity at length in Book V of Ethics, 
Aristotle noted that “ . . . justice and equity coincide, and although both are good, equity is superior…the 
essential nature of equity; it is a rectification of law in so far as law is defective on account of its generality.  
This in fact is also the reason why everything is not regulated by law: it is because there are some cases that 
no law can be framed to cover…”J.A.K. Thomson (Trans) The Ethics of Aristotle – The Nicomachean 
Ethics.(1955) New York: Penguin Books. p. 199. 
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In this situation both the hospital and the school were required to establish 
conformance to federal biosecurity requirements found at 42 CFR 73.  However, as noted 
earlier, the nature of that conformance varied.  At the hospital, because the select agent 
held was the commonly researched toxin SEB, the degree of biosecurity imposed was 
much different from the school with active anthrax spores.  The regulations exempt 
conformance if the select agents or toxins are contained in specimens or isolates of 
specimens presented for diagnosis, verification, or proficiency testing.  They further 
provide exclusions for a variety of reasons including whether or not the select agent or 
toxin is in its naturally occurring environment98.  Some attenuated strains of overlap 
select agents are determined by the HHS Secretary to “not pose a severe threat to the 
public health and safety”99   
The regulations also provide a process whereby entities can apply to the HHS and 
have investigational products exempted from the regulations.  Furthermore, the 
government retains the right to temporarily waive compliance with these regulations 
during responses to domestic or foreign public health emergencies as well as agricultural 
emergencies.100  Therefore an answer to the question as to whether equity exists in the 
application of the regulations to the several public, private, academic, and commercial 
entities is difficult to craft, for many of the exceptions and exemptions granted are 
shielded from public review and consideration.101  Equity does not exist as an 
independent factor, but rather exists within the interaction of forces within a specific 
context.  Nonetheless it is undeniable that the federal biosecurity regulations created a 
disproportionate burden on some entities102.   
                                                 
98 For example the plague Yersinia pestis is commonly found naturally occurring in Prairie Dogs in the 
Southwestern United States. 
99 42 CFR 73.5 
100 42 CFR 73.6 (b) – (e). 
101 Interviews with Biological Safety Officers at the School and Hospital confirmed the author’s 
suspicions, in that during independent interviews principals noted that some institutions receive exemptions 
as a matter of routine, while other institutions seem subject to much more detailed regulatory review.  As 
one principal noted “Politics occurs everywhere, including science.”  
102 It is noteworthy that the burden of biosecurity compliance was borne by even unexpected 
institutions. K. Carr, E. Henchal, C. Wilhelmsen and B. Carr (2004) “ Implementation of Biosurety 
Systems in a Department of Defense Medical Research Laboratory” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 




One entity that was especially and unexpectedly burdened by federal biosecurity 
regulations was The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases (USAMRIID).  This former center for military biological weapons research 
reported that the changes required to implement biosecurity have presented unique 
budgetary challenges for the institute.  The costs of compliance are enormous, especially 
for an organization whose entire funding budget in FY 2004 was less than $50 million.  
Installation of the closed circuit video system to monitor the 230 laboratories and 329 
personnel with access to select agents and toxins at Fort Detrick is estimated at $50 
million with the related physical security upgrades (gates, key card access systems and 
advanced locks) at the laboratories estimated at $12 million.  The annual recurring costs 
of the program, once completed, will be approximately $ 4 million.  These capital and 
operational costs far exceed the program costs estimated by the federal government in 
2002 at $9,300 for a small lab and $730,400 for a medium sized university for year one 
costs. 
Still it must be noted the United States is actively engaged in a serious, multi-
national conflict that includes a variety of non-state actors.  The federal government, as it 
has expressed in these regulations, has attempted to balance the needs of ongoing 
biomedical research against the need for domestic defense against biological weapons of 
war.   In the end, equity is not equivalent to convenience.  While the school was subjected 
to more intense regulation and inspection than the larger hospital, the school is also the 
host to active research with a biological select agent that the nation has classified as 
falling within Category A, high-priority agents103.  
                                                 
103 The Centers for Disease Control attributes four characteristics to Category A high-priority agents –
they can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person; result in high mortality rates and have 
the potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and require 
special action for public health preparedness. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
In the concluding chapter of the thesis, a credible answer to the research question 
is proposed. The importance of biosecurity as a public policy issue is considered and 
further opportunities for research in Homeland Security studies are outlined. 
The essential question posed within this thesis was how can specific public 
biomedical research universities securely use and store biological select agents.  The  
question is critically relevant to the practice of Homeland Security within the United 
States in the early twenty-first century. In forming an answer to that question, the topics 
of list making dynamics, statutory law and administrative regulations were explored. Two 
case studies, both involving public biomedical research universities, were crafted and 
assessed focusing on biosecurity.  Taken together this research leads to a durable and 
credible response to the research question. 
Public biomedical universities are unique institutions.  They exist to responsibly 
explore the frontiers of science while also fulfilling their core mission of public higher 
education.   Public research universities are also major societal institutions which often 
serve as the engines of scientific progress, for university-based research fuels the 
continued growth of many sectors of the American economy.   Biomedical research is an 
area of rapid expansion with revolutionary discoveries restructuring our fundamental 
understanding of biology and microbiology on a routine basis.  These academicians and 
biomedical researchers continue to grapple with the challenge of dual use.  Their 
biomedical research yields products that advance our understanding of disease and 
improves the human condition, yet those same biomedical products have the real 
potential for misuse in weapons of bioterrorism.  The enduring solution to the conundrum 
has not been reached, and the dialogue continues among researchers, regulators, and 
security professionals.  One critical element in the short-term response to the dual use 
conundrum has been the federal regulation of select biological agents and toxins.     
Regulation of biological select agents and toxins is not a new practice, but such 
regulation has been evolutionary, and the modern lineage is anchored in the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925.  An interesting, but necessary mix of international law, national 
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security decisions, statutory law, and federal regulations has methodically increased the 
control and regulation of these substances over time.  The public policy issue of the 
regulation and control of biological select agents and toxins had generally lain dormant 
until the widespread increase in public awareness of the risk the nation faces in regards to 
bioterrorism starting in the late 1990s and peaking with the anthrax attacks of 2001 in 
several cities, broadcasting facilities, postal facilities, and even the offices of the United 
States Senate.   
The dynamics which came into play with the preparation of the 2002 list of 
biological select agents and toxins can be seen as a microcosm of modern federal rule 
making under time constraints.  A current list, a product of previous regulatory attempts 
of 1997, was the basis for the discussion.  The federal regulatory agency used a variety of 
strategies during the formulation of the regulations including tripartism (involving the 
interested public, as well as regulators, and those regulated), effective information 
campaigns, and a bias towards self-regulation of the regulated entities with provisions for 
audits.  While not all parties were completely satisfied with the final regulations, those 
regulations did include conscious and planned attempts at inclusiveness. 
Still biosecurity remains a relatively new concept, and that novelty perplexes 
many microbiologists and biomedical researchers.  The viable threat of civil fines and 
criminal penalties for failure to comply with the security provisions has sent shock waves 
through the biomedical research community. While the federal regulations outline some 
very basic requirements for security, the specific eight requirements flow from a security 
systems approach to the problem of biosecurity and require the renewed attention at the 
entity level to staff access control, physical space security features, and inventory 
practices.  The answer to the question does not necessarily lie within the simplistic 
approach of more “guns, gates and guards”. 
A proven successful answer to the question of how specific public biomedical 
research universities can securely use and store biological select agents is multi-
disciplinary teamwork.  A team composed of environmental health and safety 
professionals, primary investigators, and law enforcement officers formed at individual 
biomedical research entities can effectively realize the secure use and storage of 
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biological select agents and toxins.  As was found at the two separate biomedical research 
institutions studied, such team work requires commitment from all participants, a 
willingness to communicate honestly, and a focus on the goal of biosecurity.  Imposition 
of local biosecurity regulations based solely upon a single individual or a single 
profession’s interpretation of the federal regulations is doomed to failure.  The legitimate 
and contributory views of all three disciplines are required for an effective and durable 
response to the biosecurity challenge.   
The field of biosecurity is new, and research challenges abound.  The study of 
homeland security as well is still in its infancy, but with time and the judicious 
application of the skills and expertise from the several established disciplines substantive 
progress in current homeland security core studies should be realized for the benefit of 
the nation. Three areas that seem especially rich for further research include biosecurity 
strategy, policy implementation, and biosecurity tactics.   
Security, in any of its many modern manifestations, requires tradeoffs. 
Schneier104 eloquently outlines a five-step security analysis process which could be 
usefully applied to the biosecurity effort on a institutional or national basis. In the realm 
of biosecurity strategy, a review of the changes to the list of select biological agents and 
toxins over time may yield some very useful findings.  That list is subject to biennial 
review, and those substances that are added and deleted from the list may be revealing  
both in terms of trends in microbiology and genetic engineering dual use.  Additionally, 
over a period of time the 2002 list may come to be seen as an overreaction to the socio-
political climate immediately after the 9/11 attacks.  In biosecurity, the several 
stakeholders have taken definite positions concerning the utility of the list, and it will be 
very interesting to see if these positions endure the test of time and the inevitable changes 
to the list.  It is probable that an attributable release of a biological select agent or toxin 
that is subsequently weaponized and ultimately traced back to a biomedical research 
facility will profoundly change the calculus used in designing biosecurity standards used 
                                                 
104 Schneier proposes a five step test that includes - What assets are you trying to protect; What are the 
risks to these assets; How well does the security solution mitigate those risks; What other risks does the 
security solution cause and finally What costs and tradeoffs does the security solution impose? B. Schneier 
(2003). Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World. New York: Springer-
Verlag. pp. 14-15. 
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within the United States.  Moreover, in the face of a merciless public press, the patience 
and understanding of the regulatory authorities may radically change to the overall 
detriment to American biomedical research.  
In the realm of policy implementation, a critical review of the use of the 
exemption and exception clauses to these federal regulations over a specific period of 
time may indicate some very interesting trends, for these are discretionary decisions by 
individual federal regulators initiated by the individual research entities and are thus 
shielded from public scrutiny.  Moreover, the research in this thesis indicated there is a 
none too subtle application of institutional and political power in the design and 
implementation of the biosecurity policy at the federal level.  The comprehensiveness and 
actual equity of the policy itself may be less than defensible in the light of the numerous 
exceptions and exemptions routinely granted to various large research institutions since 
adoption of the BPARA.  The unanticipated biosecurity costs for laboratories using select 
agents and toxins, e.g. the physical redesign of laboratories and laboratory security 
practices, may have an unforeseen consequence of limiting critical biomedical research 
activity to those few institutions that can afford to comply with the federal biosecurity 
policy. 
In the realm of biosecurity tactics, several issues will be of important research 
interest.  First, will the commitment to biosecurity in both public and private settings 
continue into the future?  Will the federal regulators, who have to date found gaping 
shortfalls in their biosecurity inspections of university affiliated research, find an 
increased level of voluntary compliance in the future?    Will a viable solution to the 
precise inventory of living bacteria and viruses ever be achieved?  Finally, will that 
specific technical solution translate to improved biosecurity for select agents?  Much 
work is left to be done in biosecurity, but practitioners, academics, and interested public 
and professional groups each gain from their work in this area.  Individually and together 
work in biosecurity directly contributes to both the defense and security of the homeland.  
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APPENDIX A LIST OF SELECT BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND 
TOXINS 
 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) designated the following as 
select agents or toxins at 42 CFR 73: 
 
Viruses   
• Cercopithecine herpes virus 1 (Herpes B) 
• Crimeran-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus 
• Ebola viruses 
• Lassa fever virus 
• Marburg virus 
• Monkeypox virus 
• South American haemorrhagic fever viruses (Junin, 
Machupo, Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito) 
• Tick borne encephalitis complex (falvi) viruses (Central 
European Tick-borne encephalitis, Far Eastern Tick-borne 
encephalitis, Russian spring and summer encephalitis, 
Kyasanur forest disease, Omsk hemorrhagic fever) 
• Variola major virus (Smallpox virus) 







• Shiga-like ribosome inactivating proteins 
• Tetrodotoxin 
Bacteria  
• Rickettsia prowazekii 
• Rickettsia rickettsii 
• Yersinia pestis 
Fungi  
• Coccidioides posadasii 
 
HHS-USDA OVERLAP AGENTS 
Viruses 
• Eastern equine encephalitis virus 
• Nipah virus 
• Hendra virus 
• Rift Valley fever virus 
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• Bacillus anthracis 
• Botulinum neurotoxin producing strains of Clostridium 
• Brucella abortus 
• Brucella melitinsis 
• Brucella suis 
• Burkholderia mallei 
• Burkholderis pseudomallei 
• Coxiella burnetii 
• Francisella tularensis 
Toxins  
• Botulinum neurotoxins 
• Clostridium perfingens epsilon toxin 
• Shigatoxin 
• Staphylococcal entertoxins 
• T-2 toxin 
 
Fungi   
• Cocciddioides immitis 
 
 










Attribution:  Anonymous  Name   Other 
 
After brief introduction and restatement of the purpose of the interview, I 
will conduct the interview.  I will offer them the opportunity to remain anonymous 
(a senior official at a biomedical university in the southwestern United States). 
 
 
1. How significant is the threat of bioterrorism?  Why? 
2. Do you believe there is a threat of bioterrorism at the university?  Why? 
3. Have you heard of the term “biosecurity”?  If yes, how do you define the 
term? 
4. As the Biological Safety Officer, how were you made aware of the new 
biosecurity requirements of the BPARA in 2002?   
5. How did you, in your official role as the Biological Safety Officer, address 
compliance with these new requirements? 
6. Did you, or the university, exercise the right to respond to the proposed rule 
in the Federal Register? 
7. Did the “fast track” compliance schedule present any issues? 
8. Who was involved in designing the implementation planning for compliance 
with 42 CFR 73? 
9. What challenges did you encounter, as the Biological Safety Officer in 
implementing the Select Biological Agents and Toxins at the university? 
10. Did we achieve compliance with the new regulations on schedule?  Were 
there any unforeseen challenges in compliance?  
11. As a policy issue, how controversial is the Select Agent List in your opinion? 
12. Did you encounter resistance from any segment of the university community 
in establishing compliance with these new regulations?  If yes, who and to 
what degree? 
13. Did you have any tailored outreach programs to the affected Primary 
Investigators to educate or achieve compliance with these new regulations?  
If yes, how would you assess the success of that effort? 
14. Could you estimate some of the costs for achieving compliance with the Select 
Agent biosecurity regulations at this university: 
 
Labor: 
• How many hours did you devote to this project? 
 
• During what time frame did you commit this labor? 
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• Who assisted you during this period? 
 
• How many hours did they devote to this project? 
 
• To achieve compliance with 42 CFR 73 did you receive any specialized 
training?  If so, what and when? 
 
• Did your staff require any specialized training? 
 
Equipment: 
• Did compliance require the purchase of any new equipment? 
 




• To achieve compliance did you have to refurbish/redesign/alter the 




• Were there other significant costs incurred not captured above?  If 
yes, what were they? 
 
 
15.  Finally, in retrospect, do you think that planning was successful? 
Would you have changed any element of your planning strategy? Why? 
65
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Agres, T. (2003).  “Researchers Bemoan Bioterrror Bureaucracy”.  The Scientist. 
September 23, 2003. URL available at 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20030924/02/,  accessed 7 July 2004.  
 
Allison, G. (1971).  Essence of Decision:  Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
Boston: Little, Brown. 
 
American Biological Safety Association. (2003).  ASBA Task Force White Paper:  
Understanding Biosecurity.  Washington: American Biological Safety Association. 
 
Association of American Universities, et. al. (2003) “Comments on the Interim 
Final Rule on Possession, Use and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 FR 76886”. 
 
Atlas, R. (1997).  Preventing the Misuse of Microorganisms: The Role of the 
ASM in Protecting Against Biological Weapons. URL available at 
http://www.asm.org/policy/index/asp/bid=3009 
 
Attorney General of the United States. (1993). Report to Congress on the Extent 
and Efforts of Domestic and International Terrorism on Animal Enterprises. 
 
Australian Group List of Biological Agents for Exports Control Core and 
Warning Lists.  Available at URL http://dofan.lib.uic.edu/acda/factshee/wmd, accessed 
10 July 2004.  
 
Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite.  (1992).  Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate.  New York:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Bardach, E. (1977).  The Implementation Game. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Bartholomew, R.E. and S. Wessley (2002) “Protean Nature of Mass Sociogenic Illness: From 
Possessed Nuns to Chemical and Biological Terrorism Fears” British Journal of Psychiatry 180: 300-306. 
 
Block, S. (2001). “The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons”. The American 
Scientist. Vol. 89, Number 1. 
 
Bonser, C. F. (2000).  American Public Policy Problems-Second Edition.  Upper 
Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
 
Broad, W. and J. Glanz. (2003) “Does Science Matter”.  The New York Times.  
November 11, 2003. 
 
Broad, W. (2004).  “In a Lonely Stand, A Scientist Takes On National Security 
Dogma”.  The New York Times.  June 29, 2004. 
66
Bush, G. W. (2002). National Strategy for Homeland Security.  URL available at 
http://.www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/. 
 
Bush, G. W. (2002).  Remarks of the President of the United States at Signing of 
H.R. 2448, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002. 
 
Carr, K. et.al. (2004). “Implementation of Biosurety Systems in a Department of 
Defense Medical Research Laboratory”  Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice and Science.  Volume 2, Number 1. 
 
Carus, W.S. (2001). Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological 
Agents Since 1900.  Washington: National Defense University. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2002). “Regulatory Impact Analysis. 
42 CFR Part 73, Select Biological Agents and Toxins, Interim Final Rule”. 
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003). “Public Comments on New 
Regulation”  03-SAR-013.  URL available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/comments/03sar013.htm, accessed 24 June 2004.  
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003). “Select Agent Program”.  
URL available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap, accessed 9 April 2004.  
 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2003) “Additional Requirements for 
Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents”.  RIN 0905-AE70. URL available at: 
http://wwww.cdc.gov/od/sap/42cfr72.htm, accessed 26 August 2004.  
 
Clinton. W. (1998).  Remarks of the President at the United States Naval 
Academy Commencement. 
 
Cohen, W. (1997). “Annual Report to the President and Congress”.  Department 
of Defense. 
 
Cole, L. (1997).  The Eleventh Plague. New York: W.H. Freeman. 
 
Cole, L. (2003).  The Anthrax Letters: A Medical Detective Story.  Washington: 
John Henry Press. 
 
Danzig, R. (2003).  Catastrophic Bioterrorism – What Is To Be Done. 
Washington:  National Defense University. 
 
Davis, S. (2002).  “Government tightens controls on lab agents”. DVM.  October. 
 
E-Medicine Consumer Health.  (2004).  Bioterrorism and Warfare. URL available 
at http://www.emedicinehealth.com/articles/15704-5.asp, accessed 10 May 2004.  
 
67
Elmore, R.F. (1982). “Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Public 
Policy Decisions” in W. Williams (1982). Studying Implementation: Methodological and 
Administrative Issues.  Chatham:  Chatham Publishing. 
 
Ember, L. (2002).“Biotechnology: A Two Edged Sword”. Chemical & 
Engineering News. June 17, 2002. 
 
Enserink, M. and D. Malakoff. (2001). “Congress Weighs Select Agent Update.” 
Science. November 16, 2001. 
 
Falkenrath, R., R. Newman and B. Thayer. (2001). America’s Achilles’ Heel. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Federal Register. (1999).  Sharing Biomedical Research Resources: Principles and 
Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts.  Federal Register 
Notice. Tuesday. May 25, 1999. 64FR28205. 
 
Federal Register. (2002). Part IV, Department of Health and Human Services, 42 
Part 73, Office of the Inspector General. 
 
Federal Register. (2004). Office of Science and Technology Policy: Workshop on 
Biosecurity.   
 
Fierer, J. and T. Kirkland. (2002).  “Questioning the CDC’s ‘select agent’ 
criteria”.  Science. January 4, 2002. 
 
Franz, D. (1998). “International Biological Warfare Threat in CONUS”. Posture 
Statement to the United States Senate’s Joint Committee on Judiciary and Intelligence. 
March 4, 1998. 
 
Freeh, L. (1997). “Counterterrorism”. Statement before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee., U.S. Senate., May 13, 1997. 
 
General Accounting Office. (2002). Homeland Security: New Department Could 
Improve Biomedical R&D Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts.  GAO-
02-924T. 
 
General Accounting Office. (2002).  Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the 
Select Agent Program.  GAO-03-315R. 
 
Goldstein, A. and S. Cohen. (2004). “The Rules That Apply”  Washington Post 
National Weekly Edition.  August 23-29, 2004. 
 
Health and Human Services.  (2002).  Public Meeting on the Interim Final Rule 
for Select Agents, December 16, 2002.   
 
68
Hospital. (2004).  Chief Financial Officer’s Hospital Quick Reference Data. 
 
Hospital. (2004).  Fact Book. 
 
Hospital. (2004).  President’s Annual Address.  October 18, 2004. 
 
Huse, E.E. (1975). Organizational Development and Change. New York: West 
Publishing. 
 
Jenike, M. (1994). “Managing the patient with treatment-resistant obsessive-
compulsive disorder”. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. 55:3 (suppl) 11-17, 1994. 
 
Kempf, E.J. (2003).  “Time’s Up: The Effects of time Urgency on Dyadic 
Performance”.  Missouri Western University Clearinghouse. 
 
Kortepeter, M. and G. Parker. (1999). “Potential Biological Weapons Threats”. 
Emerging Infectious Diseases. Volume 5, No.4, July-August 1999. 
 
Kotter, J.P. and L.A. Schlesinger. (1979). “Choosing Strategies for Change”. 
Harvard Business Review.  Volume 57, March-April 1979. 
 
Leader, S. (1997). “The Rise of Terrorism” Security Management.  URL available 
at http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/000339 
 
Lepore, S. and J. Smyth. (2002). The Writing Cure:  How Expressive Writing 
Promotes Health and Well-Being.  Washington: American Psychological Association. 
 
Malakoff, D. (2002).  “Congress adopts tough rules for labs”. Science. May 31 
2002. 
 
Malakoff, D. (2003). “Tighter security reshapes research”.  Science.  September 
6, 2003. 
 
Mayor, A. (2003).  Greek Fire, Posion Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and 
Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World. New York: Overlook Press. 
 
Mestel, R. (2002).  “In the Lab:  Suspicion Spreads”.  The Los Angeles Times.  
August 28, 2002. 
 
Moore, M. (1995).  Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government.  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Nadler, D.A. and M.L. Tushman. (1989). “Organizational Frame Bending: 
Principles for managing Reorientation”.  The Academy of Management Executives. 
Volume 3, pp.194-204. 
 
69
“Nation a Mix of Emotions on Homeland Security”.  PA Times. Vol. 27. No.4. 
 
National Academy of Sciences. (1982). Scientific Communication and National 
Security. Washington:  National Academy of Sciences Press. 
 
National Academy of Sciences. (2003). Biotechnology Research in an Age of 
Terrorism: Confronting the Dual Use Dilemma. Advance executive summary available at 
URL: http://books.nap.edu/books/0309089778/html/, accessed 13 July 2004.  
 
National Institutes of Health. (1999). “Laboratory Security and Emergency 
Response for Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories. Fourth Edition. Appendix F.  
Accessed on 18 April 2004 at http://www.bmbl.od.nih.gov/appendf.htm 
 
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. (2004).  FAQs.  Accessed on 
26 December 2004 at http://www.biosecurityboard.gov/faq.htm . 
 
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 35.  (1970).  
 
Office of the Inspector General, Southeast Region, US Department of Agriculture. 
(2003).  Audit Report: Controls Over Biological, Chemical and Radioactive materials at 
Institutions Funded by the United States Department of Agriculture.  50099-14-AT, 
September 2003. 
 
O’Hare, M. (1982).  “Informational Strategies as Regulatory Surrogates”.  In 
Eugene Bardach (ed.)  Social Regulation: Strategies for Reform.  San Franciso:  Institute 
for Contemporary Studies. 
 
Preston, R. (1996).  The Hot Zone. New York: Random House Value Publishing. 
 
Preston, R. (1998).  The Cobra Event. New York: Random House Value 
Publishing. 
 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous of 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of War (June 17, 1925). 
 
Public Law 104-132. (1996). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996. 
 
Public Law 107-54. (2001). Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (US Patriot Act). 
 
Public Law 107-188. (2002). Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. 
 
70
Quinlist, P.  (2001). “Combating Terrorism:  Federal Response to Biological 
Weapons Attack.” Statement before The Committee on Government Reform, US House 
of Representatives – June 21, 2001. 
 
Reinhart, P. (2003).  “New Select Agent Rules will be Costly for Research 
Universities”.  NCURA Newsletter.  Vol. XXXV. No.1. 
 
Saint Louis University. (2003).  Bioterrorism Bibliography. URL available at 
http://www.slu.edu/colleges/sph/csbei/bioterrorism/bibliography.htm, accessed 2 
November 2004.  
 
Salerno, R. and J. Koelm. (2002). Biological Laboratory and Transportation 
Security and the Biological Weapons Convention.  SAND No. 2002-1076B. 
 
Schemo, D. (2002). “Threats and Responses: Laboratories”.  The New York 
Times.  December 17, 2002. 
 
Schemo, D. (2003).  “Threats and Responses: Bioterrorism”.  The New York 
Times. January 10, 2003. 
 
Schneier, B. (2003).  Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security In An 
Uncertain World.  New York: Copernicus Books. 
 
School. (2004).  Environmental Health and Safety Information. 
 
School. (2004). Fact Book. 
 




Sinai, J. (2003).  “Red Teaming the Terrorist Threat to Preempt the Next Waves 
of Catastrophic Terrorism.” 14th Annual NDIA So/LIC Symposium. 
 
Sparrow, M. (2000).  The Regulatory Craft.  Washington: Brookings Institute. 
 
Tenent, G. (1997).  Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United 
States. Washington:  Government Printing Office.   
 
Thomas, P. (2003). “From Saviors to Suspects: New Threats to Infectious Disease 
Research” in R.C. Leone and G. Anrig, Jr. (Eds.) The War on Your Freedoms: Civil 
Liberties in an Age of Terrorism.  New York: Century Foundation. 
 
Thomson, J.A.K. (1955). The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics.  New 
York: Penguin Books. 
 
71
Tindale, R. (1998). Theory and Research on Small Groups. New York: Plenum 
Press. 
 
United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. (2004). 
Short History of Biowarfare.  URL available at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usamriid/bw-hist.htm. 
 
Van Wees, H. (2004).  “Germs of Truth”.  American Scientist. May-June 2004. 
 
Wheelis, M. (2002). “A Short History of Biological Warfare and Weapons” in 
Chevier, M. et. al. (2002) The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to 
Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.  Amsterdam: ISO Press. 
 
World Health Organization. (1970).  Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons.  Geneva: World Health Organization.  
 
Zaltman, G. and R. Duncan. (1977). Strategies for Planned Change. New York: 


















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
73
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvior, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Paul Stockton, Director 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
   
4. Edward Shine, Executive Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs 
The University of Texas System 
Austin, Texas  
 
5. Roy Baldridge, Director 
The University of Texas System 
Austin, Texas 
   
6. William Adcox, Chief of Police 
The University of Texas at Houston Police Department 
Houston, Texas 
 
